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"Doch ach! Was hilft dem Menschengeist Verstand,
Dem Herzen Gite, Willigkeit der Hand,
Wenn's fieberhaft durchaus im Staate witet
Und Obel sich in Ubeln iberbrftet?"
-

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.**

"This civil service law is the biggest fraud of the age. It is the
curse of the nation. There can't be no real patriotism while it
lasts."
-

George Washington Plunkitt.***
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INTRODUCTION

By fits and starts, as they lurch from one ethical crisis to another,
American governments-national, state, and local-have sought,
thus far largely in vain, to create and implement a coherent framework of ethical standards for government officials. It is the thesis
of this article that all such attempts at ethics reform are destined
to failure until legislators finally realize that ethical requirements
do not exist in a vacuum but are part and parcel of a much larger
public administrative law context. American legal writers have wholly
failed to apprehend this simple truth: that the rights and obligations,
including the ethical obligations, of public officials are but flip sides
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of the same coin. One side may not be regulated without affecting
the other. "Rights and duties must counterbalance each other." 1
This article seeks to drive home that lesson by comparing the public
administrative law context of ethics laws for West German and
American public officials.
It must be emphasized at the outset that this article addresses
only ethics requirements for "public officials" -that is, those higher
level American public servants who, particularly at the state and
local level, are often exempted from many civil service requirements
and protections. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the admittedly
controversial views expressed here are intended not as a program
for reform but as an impetus to discussion, not as manna but as
medicine. There can be no sacred cows in the struggle for ethics
reform: political patronage, employment at will, civil service, and
affirmative action, for example, must all be reexamined.
The stumble-bum approach of American politicians to the revision
of ethics statutes has been demonstrated most recently by the debacle
over a new federal ethics law. On October 21, 1988, Congress passed
H.R. 5043, the Post-Employment Restrictions Act of 1988, which
would have added to existing law further restrictions upon the conduct
of federal officers, employees, and elected officials after they leave
government service.
To his credit, President Reagan, on November 26, 1988, pocketvetoed that bill as "flawed, excessive, and discriminatory. ' 2 The
President was absolutely correct in concluding that "the final provisions of this bill were poorly drafted, would have applied unevenly,
and would discourage from government service America's best talent
because of the unfair burdens it would impose ....
[The proposed
Act] would have prohibited conduct of former Federal employees
unrelated to genuine ethical concerns." ' 3 Not surprisingly, in the bill
Congress had seen fit to protect its own by subjecting its members
and employees to restrictions less onerous than those applied to
4
executive branch employees.
H. SCHEERBARTH & H. H6FFKEN, BEAMTENRECHT LEHR- UND HANDBUCH 369
(5th ed. 1985). Translations in this article are by the author.
2 Memorandum of Disapproval for the Post-Employment Restrictions Act of
1988, in the WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1561 (Nov. 23, 1988) ("Reagan Memorandum
of Disapproval").
IId. at 1561-62.
4 Compare H.R. 5043's proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)-(d) (1982)
with the bill's proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1982). See also Reagan
Memorandum of Disapproval, at 1562. But see Additional Views of Hon. Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., accompanying H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 46-47.
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In a knee-jerk editorial ("An Opportunity on Ethics, Trashed"),
the New York Times castigated Mr. Reagan for "thr[owing] away
the chance to strike a blow for clean government and repair his own
damaged reputation on the 'sleaze' issue." 5 Common Cause President
Fred Wertheimer also lost no time in jerking his knee, proclaiming
that the President's veto "leaves the door wide open to further abuses
'6
and sleaze in government."
Both the Congress and the Times were in turn chastised by the
director of the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties
Union, who pointed out that "in seeking to criminalize lobbying and
activities intended to influence the Government, Congress [in H.R.
5043] is regulating the freedom of political speech at the core of the
First Amendment." ' 7 Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary themselves questioned the constitutionality of H.R. 5043, not
only on First Amendment grounds but also on grounds of the speech
and debate clause and "taking" without due process by prohibiting
individuals from earning a living and practicing a profession.8 Indeed,
it was reported that "[d]ozens of House and Senate members made
it clear they voted for the bill only because it would have been
politically unwise to vote 'no' on an ethics bill just before an election." 9
This entire charade would be laughable were it not for the desperate
need for ethics reform. The Reagan administration itself has been
characterized by some as the most corrupt in this century, with the
possible exception of Warren Harding's. A popular cartoonist resorted

I N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at A24, col. 1. See also id., Jan. 3, 1989, at A18,
col. 1 ("A Blueprint for Government Ethics").
6 Quoted in Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1988, at Al.
7 Halperin & Harris, "On Ethics, Reagan Finally Did Right,"
N.Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1988, § 4, at 31, col. 1 (stating that "[b]y vetoing the so-called Ethics Bill,
President Reagan finally did something that merited applause" but that "[i]nstead,
he was denounced reflexively by many liberals and editorial board guardians of the
Constitution who should have known better").
I See Additional Views of Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Hon. Don Edwards, and
Hon. Lamar Smith, accompanying H.R. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at
47-49, 54-58. Even the House Judiciary Report on H.R. 5043 conceded that postemployment restrictions raise "[a] number of constitutional issues . . .includfing]
whether the proposed prohibition constitutes a bill of attainder; a 'taking' without
due process of law (i.e., as a prohibition on earning a living and practicing a
profession); and an unconstitutional prohibition on free speech, free association,
and/or the right to petition for redress of grievances." H.R. Rep. No. 1068, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 12.
9 Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1988, at Al ("Reagan Pocket-Vetoes Stricter Ethics
Rules").
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to listing name after name of administration members who had
resigned under an ethical cloud; indeed, more than 100 administration
officials were accused of wrongdoing, and two of the President's
closest advisers were convicted of ethics violations. 10 Then-Vice President George Bush's press secretary conceded that "[t]he term 'politician' is often a pejorative. People outside Washington curl their
lip."" Not surprisingly, ethics-the "sleaze factor"-became an issue
in the presidential campaign, as both sides pledged themselves to an
administration of high ethical standards. 2 Yet, despite his efforts to
make good on his pledge, 3 President Bush's administration was almost immediately embroiled in controversies over the ethics of key
aides.' 4 Needless to say, neither party has a monopoly on ethical
problems, as former House Speaker Jim Wright could attest.
At the state and local level, ethics are no less in the air. In New
York State, where the state legislature and New York City have been
10Gannett Westchester Newspapers, July 26, 1988, at A7, col. 1. Lyn Nofziger
was convicted of violating the 1978 Ethics in Government Act; Michael K. Deaver
was convicted of perjury. H.R. 5043 would have eliminated the compartmentalization
of the White House into numerous agencies for ethics law purposes, the loophole
that permitted Deaver to avoid an ethics law conviction. See also, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1988, at A30, col. 1 ("Mr. Deaver's Compartments"); id., July 19, 1988,
at Al, col. 1 ("Prosecutor Finds Meese in the Clear in Major Scandals - Ethics
Questioned").
,1Statement by Sheila Tate, quoted in, Gannett Westchester Newspapers, July
26, 1988, at A7, col. 1.
12 See, e.g., "Bush Pledges High Ethics," N.Y. Times, July 27, 1988, at A16,
col. 4; Gannett Westchester Newspapers, July 26, 1988, at A7, col. 1 ("Bush to
Propose New Conflict-of-Interest Rules").
13 Members of the President-elect's transition team were required to sign a statement of "Transition Standards of Conduct." That statement required those individuals to hold in confidence any non-public information; precluded them from
using or permitting the use of any non-public information for private gain; required
that they disqualify themselves from involvement in any particular transition matter
that to their knowledge might directly conflict or appear to conflict with a financial
interest of themselves, their family, friends, or business associates; and mandated
that they protect federal property entrusted to them and not use it for purposes not
directly related to transition activities. Attachment to Memorandum from Pres.
Ronald Reagan for Heads of Departments and Agencies, dated Nov. 18, 1988. See
also "Bush Plans Tough Ethics Message in First Working Day as President," N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at Al, col. 3
(describing ethics commission to be appointed by the new president); "Bush Offers
Wide-Ranging Legislation on Ethics," N.Y. Times, April 13, 1989, at B10, col. 3.
See, e.g., "Conflict over Ethics Divides 2 of Bush's Closest Advisers," N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1; "Baker Selling his Stock to Avoid any Conflict
in State Dept. Role," id. at Al, col. 2; "Ethics Panel Votes to Relax Stock Sale
Rule," id. at A22, col. 4; "An Odd Way to Raise Ethical Standards," id. Feb. 22,
1989, at A26, col. 1 (editorial).
4
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racked by scandal, Governor Mario Cuomo appointed a special commission to investigate unethical conduct in government and to make
recommendations for reform. Shortly after the formation of that
commission, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York announced that in an FBI sting operation, 105 of 106
municipal purchasing officials offered bribes had accepted them (the
lone holdout wanted more money). 5 Thus cynicism pervades the
citizenry, and demoralization enfeebles honest public officials.
Yet for all the clamor for ethics reform, American legal writers,
with the provincial air of gum-chonking American tourists, have given
virtually no thought to how other countries have come to grips with
these same, complex problems. West Germany, for example, has a
stronger statutory tradition than the United States, a longer history
of ethics regulation, and, most importantly, a view of ethics laws as
an integral part of public law as a whole. Indeed, this author's research
has revealed that the whole of post-war American legal literature
contains not one article on ethical requirements for public officials
in civil law countries.1 6 The present article is meant as a first step
toward filling that vacuum and providing some fresh insight into how
one might approach ethics requirements for American public officials.

I.

STRUCTURE OF

ETMCS

REGULATIONS FOR AMERICAN PUBLIC

OFFICIALS
Before examining the public law context of German ethics laws,
one needs as background a general understanding of the structure of
ethical requirements for public officials in the United States. Ethics
laws in this country have proceeded not from a comprehensive view
of the rights and duties of public officials but largely in reaction to
specific scandals, and until recently on a piecemeal basis. Thus, for
example, "it was an environment of actual fraudulent claims, sale
of information, claim chasing, overt sale of influence, improper
diversion of public funds, corruption in public office, and wartime

1,See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 2. It should be noted that the
officials to whom the bribes were offered had been specifically targeted by the FBI
as likely to accept them. See id.
16 Two articles have recently appeared on ethical standards for public officials

in Great Britain. See Vaughn, The Role of Statutory Regulation of Public Service
Ethics in Great Britain and the United States, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
341 (1981), and Vaughn, Implications of the British Experience on Administrative
Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in the Federal Civil Service, 30 AM. U.L. REv.
705 (1981).
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contiact frauds and favoritism" before and during the Civil War
7
that produced the earliest federal statutes on conflict of interest.'
Those early statutes prohibited government employees from assisting
in the prosecution of any claim against the United States (1853),
forbade members of Congress and government officers from accepting
payment for procuring a government contract for any person or for
helping any person to procure the contract (1862), prohibited government employees from acting as officers or agents for the government in the transaction of business with any business entity of which
they are an officer or in which they have a pecuniary interest (1863),
and forbade government employees from rendering services for compensation before an executive branch agency in relation to any matter
in which the United States is a party or is directly or indirectly

interested (1864). 18
The Watergate scandal similarly produced a flurry of ethics legislation in federal, state, and local government, including, for example, the 1978 federal Ethics in Government Act, 9 and numerous
state ethics laws, such as Alabama's Code of Ethics for Public
Officials and Employees, which is one of the toughest state ethics
laws in the nation and which applies to all Alabama state and local
officials alike. 20 In 1976 the National Municipal League undertook
its Ethics Project, which in 1979 produced a Model State Conflict
of Interest and Financial Disclosure Law. More recently, in response
to the scandals noted at the outset of this article, New York State
enacted an Ethics in Government Act covering, primarily, statewide
elected officials, state officers and employees, state legislators, and
state legislative employees; 21 and in New York City the Charter Revision Commission proposed sweeping reforms to that municipality's

11AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND FEDERAL SERVICE 36 (1960).
11Id., at 36-44; 10 Stat. 170 (1853), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 205
(1982); 12 Stat. 577 (1862); 12 Stat. 696 (1863), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 208 (1982); and 13 Stat. 123 (1864), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 203
(1982).
19 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.
10See ALA. CODE § 36-25-1(9), (11) (1988 Supp). See also, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 82048, 87100, 87200, 87300, 87302 (West 1987 and 1989 Supp.); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 268A, §§ 1(d), (g), (m)-(o), (q) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & 1988 Supp).
21 Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404. See generally Newman
[former Chairman, New York State Common Cause], New York's New Ethics Law:
Turning the Tide on Corruption, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 319 (1988).
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own ethics code, reforms adopted by referendum on election day,
November 8, 1988. 22
The courts have for the most part upheld carefully drafted ethics
statutes. In addition, the Supreme Court has struck down on First
Amendment grounds the dismissal of a public employee for political
patronage reasons, at least unless the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
23
performance of the public office involved.
Ethics laws in the United States usually have four major components: conflicts of interest prohibitions; financial disclosure requirements; penalties; and administrative provisions.2 The structure of
2 5
those laws varies widely.

In a companion movement, the Congress and state legislatures have enacted
statutes to restrict campaign expenditures, contributions, and political action committees. Most notable of those efforts is the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 et seq. (1982). See also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-59 (1976) (per
curiam) (upholding FECA's limitations on contributions by individuals and multicandidate political committees to political candidates and their committees, but
striking down, as unconstitutional, restrictions on campaign expenditures by candidates from personal or family resources and on expenditures made independent
of the candidate), and FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,
470 U.S. 480, 490-501 (1985) (holding unconstitutional 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, which provision made it a criminal offense
for independent political committees to expend more than $1,000 to further the
election of a Presidential candidate who has elected to accept public financing).
2
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Lieberman
v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Elrod's principle to politically
motivated harassment that falls short of dismissal).
24 See National Municipal League, Model State Conflict of Interest and Financial
Disclosure Law (1979) (hereafter "NML MODEL"). See also National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers, Model Ordinance on Code of Ethics, in NIMLO Ordinance
Service (1981). See generally Prof. Zimmerman's articles on municipal ethics codes:
Ethics in Local Government, 8 Management Information Service Report, No. 8, at
1 (1976); Ethics in Local Government, 9 Planning and Administration, No. 1, at
33 (1982); Ethics in Public Service, 14 State and Local Government Review, No. 3,
at 98 (1982). Recent law review articles on ethics laws for American public officials
include the following: Little, Abolishing Financial Disclosure to Improve Government,
16 STETSON L. Rnv. 633 (1987); Bauer, Ethics Laws and Rules in Politics, 34 FED.
B. NEws & J. 66 (1987); Hannah, The Local Miscarriage of Economic Disclosure,
74 ILL. B.J. 300 (1986); Millus, Ethics in Federal Public Service, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J.,
July 1983, at 26; Jack, Constitutional Aspects of Financial Disclosure under the
Ethics in Government Act, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 583 (1981).
2
See Bigelow [Research Director of the NML Ethics Project], Draft Report to
Commission on Government Integrity (Institute of Public Administration, March
1988) (hereinafter "BIGELOW REPORT").
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"There are two basic philosophies regarding conflicts of interest.
The first is: if the conflict is disclosed, for the most part that is
sufficient. Recusal or disqualification from official action may be
required in some cases but it is disclosure that is the true heart of
the matter. If the action is a matter of public concern, that will be
reflected at the next election. . . . The second philosophy maintains
that there are certain activities which should be prohibited and others
which should be limited. ' 26 To those three methods of avoiding real
or apparent conflicts of interest-disclosure, recusal, and prohibition-may be added a fourth: divestiture by the official of any interest
27
that may cause a conflict.
The conflict of interest provisions in a comprehensive ethics law
might, for example, prohibit public employees from taking an official
action (or failing to take an official action) in order to gain a financial
benefit for themselves or their family or business, or from otherwise
using their public position for private financial gain. Most ethics acts
prohibit public employees from seeking or accepting employment from
any business that the employee's department or agency regulates.
Most ethics acts also restrict or prohibit public employees from being
a party to, or having an interest in, government contracts, government
procurement, or investment of public funds. Restrictions on the solicitation or receipt of gifts from persons having business dealings
with the governmental entity are also common, as are restrictions on
the use of confidential information for private gain. A general prohibition on public officials acquiring conflicts of interest is also not

unusual .28
More restrictive ethics acts might prohibit public officials from
representing anyone before a government agency, except in an official
capacity; from counseling persons, except in an official capacity,
2 Id., at 15.
27 See NEW

YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRT,

Enmcs

N

GOVERNMENT ACT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (April 6, 1988).
28See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, MUNICIPAL
ETmCAL STANDARDS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH, App. A (MuNICIPAL ETlucs
ACT FOR NEW YORK STATE MuNIcPALrnIs) §§ 4-5 (Dec. 1988) (hereinafter N.Y.
ST. COMM'N DRAFT); BIGELOW REPORT, App. A (comparing ethics laws of Alabama,
Alaska, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Virginia); N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW §§ 800-809 (McKinney 1986 & 1989 Supp.); NML
MODEL §§ 11-19. See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.202-735.204, 735.206, 735.303, 735.305
(1988). The substantive provisions of the Municipal Ethics Act proposed by the New

York State Commission have been adopted by Governor Cuomo as a program bill
(No. 131), which was introduced in the New York State Legislature on April 13,
1989 (A. 7953).
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about their business dealings with the government; from appearing
in any matter against the interest of the governmental entity; or even
from accepting any outside employment during the period of public
service. 29 Among the most controversial provisions of any ethics law
are post-employment restrictions, also known as "revolving door"
provisions. 30 Violations of the revolving door prohibitions of the
federal Ethics in Government Act formed the basis of the prosecution
31
of Lyn Nofziger.
No less controversial are restrictions on public officials engaging
in political activity or soliciting political contributions, for example
contributions from other public officials or from persons with bids
or applications pending before a government agency.3 2 In this writer's
experience, such restrictions are opposed by public officials and political party officials less on First Amendment grounds than for
practical reasons. The lack of interested individuals to fill local political party positions is already critical; further restricting the pool
of potential district leaders or committee persons is viewed as a
possibly devastating blow to political organizations at the local level.
Many elected officials also believe that they have an absolute right
to require their senior advisors to provide financial and other support
for re-election efforts.
Disclosure requirements are of two types, transactional and periodic. Transactional disclosure occurs when a public employee, faced

See, e.g., ALASKA

STAT.

§

39.50.090(c)-(d) (1987); MASS.

GEN. L. ch.

268A,

§ 11 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & 1988 Supp.); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 102.03(A) (Anderson
1984 & 1987 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5(e) (1984 & 1988 Supp.); NML MODEL
§§ 11(b)-(d), 12; N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT § 4(1)(d)-(f).
30 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-13 (1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 87400-87405
(West 1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268A, §§ 12, 18 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & 1988 Supp.);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988); NML MODEL § 20; N.Y. ST. COMi'N
DRAFT § 4(1)(k)-(l). See also Regulations Concerning Post Employment Conflict of
Interest, 5 C.F.R. part 737 (1988).
3' See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
32 See, e.g., N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFr § 4(1)(g)-(i). Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.020e
(1988) (state election commission members). The Hatch Political Activities Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 7321-7327 (1982), prohibits federal executive branch employees from
"tak[ing] an active part in political management or in political campaigns" (5 U.S.C.
§ 7324(a)(2)) but specifically protects an employee's right to "express his [or her]
opinion on political subjects and candidates" (5 U.S.C. § 7324(b)). See also Political
Activity of Federal Employees, 5 C.F.R. part 733 (1988). See generally Biller v.
United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 863 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1988); Vaughn,
Restrictions on the Political Activities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act and
Beyond, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 516 (1976). All fifty states have equivalents of the
Hatch Act. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 604-605 n.2 (1973) (collecting
statutes). See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 1983).
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with a potential conflict of interest, discloses that conflict to the
appropriate body, such as an ethics board. Transactional disclosure
provisions thus only come into play when a specific, actual or potential
conflict of interest arises. However, they often require that the affected employee recuse or disqualify himself or herself from acting
with respect to the matter.33
In this writer's experience, provisions for periodic (usually annual)
financial disclosure are the single most controversial part of an ethics
law. However, such provisions
provide a mechanism to check whether the proper actions are taken
when disclosure of a conflict or disclosure and recusal are required.
They allow a way to discover if prohibited actions are taken. An
important purpose is to make available sufficient relevant information to allow citizens to judge whether officials are acting in the
public interest or too much in their own personal financial interest.
They also serve to remind public officials to examine their actions
conflicts of
in light of their holdings and to be aware of possible
34
interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest.
The Senate Report on the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 cited
as further reasons for public financial disclosure the conclusions that
such disclosure will increase public confidence in the government,
will demonstrate the high level of integrity of the vast majority of
government officials, will deter conflicts of interest from arising, will
deter some persons who should not be entering public service from
doing so, and will better enable the public to judge the performance
of public officials. 5
The periodic disclosure provisions of ethics laws vary widely. Such
laws might require the disclosure, for example, of the identity of the
public official's private employer, the nature of any private employment, professional services rendered, sources of income, clients or
customers, investments, real estate interests, debts, leases or contracts
with public entities, compensated representation before public entities,
offices and directorships, retainers, fees or honoraria, reimbursements

11See, e.g., NML MODEL §§ 16-17; N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT § 5. See also
Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements, 5 C.F.R. part 734 (1988);
5 C.F.R. §§ 735.401-735.412 (1988).
34

BIGELow REPORT, at 16-17.

31 S.

&

REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 21-22, reprintedin U.S.

ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4237-38 (1978).

CODE CONG.
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of travel expenses, and trusts for which the official is a trustee.16
Penalties also vary widely among the various ethics acts. Criminal
penalties include fines and imprisonment, a maximum of ten years
and $10,000 in Alabama, for example. 37 Civil penalties include civil
fines; warning, reprimand, suspension, or removal from office; the
payment of damages to the municipality; and civil forfeiture, for
38
example three times the amount of any ill gotten gain.
Most ethics acts are administered by some kind of board or commission. The structure of those boards, their powers and duties, their
degree of centralization, and the qualifications of board members
range widely, as do the types of public officials covered by the ethics
acts.
Finally, some ethics laws regulate not only the public officials but
certain private citizens as well. Bribery prohibitions are the most
obvious. At least one state's ethics code for municipal officials requires bidders, or applicants for permits, to disclose family relationships or business dealings with any official who might pass upon the
bid or application.3 9 One proposed ethics act would also make it a
criminal offense for any person to induce a public official to violate
the act, and prescribes debarment from public contracts as a penalty.4
Such restrictions on private citizens lie beyond the scope of this
article.
II.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GERMAN ETmcs LAWS

One cannot understand either German ethics laws or the public
administrative law context of those laws without some idea of their
historical development. Indeed, to a large extent history dictates
36 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1982) (legislative branch); 5 U.S.C. App. 4, §§ 201212 (1982) (executive branch); 28 U.S.C. App., §§ 301-309 (1982) (judicial branch);
NML MODEL § 10; N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT § 6. See generally BIGELOW REPORT,
at 23-27 and App. A. A particularly onerous financial disclosure form may be found
in N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 73-a(3) (McKinney 1988), enacted as part of New York's
1987 Ethics in Government Act, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404.

ALA. CODE § 36-25-27 (1988 Supp.).
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 91000-91015 (West 1987 & 1989 Supp.); NML
MODEL §§ 21-25; N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT § 12.
39 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 809 (McKinney 1986); N.Y. ST. COMM'N
DRArr § 9..
o See N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT §§ 10-11. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2070) (1982) (former
37

38

officer or employee who violates revolving door provisions may be prohibited from
appearing before, or communicating with, his or her former department or agency
for up to five years).
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Germany's integrated approach to the rights and ethical obligations
of public officials.
A.

German Ethics Laws in the Context of German Law

As a civil law system, German law derives from statute, not from
case law. Like any legal system, Germany's strives for predictability,
fairness, and uniformity of result. Similar cases should produce similar
outcomes. Yet to achieve that uniformity, a German court, unlike
its American counterpart, does not give substantial weight to prior
decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction. Rather the German
court, in interpreting the applicable statute, relies primarily on the
views expressed by the various federal supreme courts and, to a lesser
extent, on the distillation of cases by commentators on the statutory
law. Commentators are accorded a higher status in Germany than
in the United States, and several noted commentaries exist on each
major area of the law.
Like the United States, West Germany is a federal republic and
accordingly has both federal and state statutes. Article 70 of the West
German Constitution empowers the German states to legislate "to
the extent that this Constitution does not grant legislative authority
to the Republic. ' 41 In areas that the Constitution has designated as
lying within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Republic, states may
legislate only to the extent expressly permitted by federal law.4 2
In areas of concurrent jurisdiction, states may legislate to the extent
that the Republic has not legislated in the area; however, the Republic
may only legislate in such areas to the extent that a need exists for
federal regulation, either because the matter cannot be effectively
Technically, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany is not a
"Constitution" (Verfassung) but a "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz, abbreviated as "GG").
"The Basic Law is provisional to the extent that, by its terms [GG art. 146], in the
event of reunification [of the two Germanies] the entire German people would adopt
a constitution in a free election. Until that time, however, the Basic Law has the
same meaning as a constitution." PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSA T DER BUNDESREGIERUNG, TATSACHEN UBER DEUTSCHLAND 90 (1972). The word "Constitution" is
41

used throughout this article to refer to that Basic Law. It should also be noted that
the FRG Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag and
Bundesrat (art. 79(1)-(2)); however, certain provisions - those establishing basic
individual rights and the democratic and federal nature of the government - may
not be thus amended (art. 79(3)).
42 GG art. 71. Such matters include, for example, foreign affairs, defense, federal
citizenship and immigration, currency, customs, foreign commerce, federal railroads
and air traffic, postal and telecommunications services, copyrights, and protection
of industrial property rights. GG art. 73.
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regulated by state laws, because regulation of the matter by a state
could prejudice the interests of other states or of the nation, or
because the preservation of legal or economic uniformity, in particular
the preservation of the unity of living conditions beyond the territory
of a state, so requires. 43 As a result of the extensive concurrent
jurisdiction of the Republic, many areas of law regulated by the
states in the United States are regulated by federal statute in Germany,
including, for example, civil and criminal procedure (in the Zivilprozessordnung and Strafprozessordnung), contract and tort law (in
the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), and penal law (in the Strafrecht).4 By
amendment to the Constitution, the Republic has been given concurrent jurisdiction over the salaries and pensions of public officials
of the states.

45

Finally, in certain areas, the Republic may only enact "framework
laws" (Rahmenvorschriften), which establish minimum standards with
which state laws on the matter must comply. A framework law does
not preempt consistent state legislation.46 In particular, the Republic
may enact framework laws regulating the legal relations of members
of the public service of the states, municipalities, and other public
law bodies. 47 Accordingly, this article primarily examines three statutes
regulating public officials: the Bundesbeamtengesetz (Federal Public

GG art. 72. Such matters include, for example, civil law, criminal law, courts
and court procedure, the legal profession, public welfare, economic law (e.g., mining,
industry, crafts, trades, commerce, banking and stock exchanges, private insurance),
labor law, the prevention of the abuse of economic power, agriculture, real property
law, the medical profession, food, medicines and drugs, navigation and shipping,
motor transport, traffic and highways, and environmental protection. GG art. 74.
See GG art. 74(1).
GG art. 74a; Bundesgesetzblatt ("BGBI.") I, 206 (March 18, 1971). However,
laws regulating these matters require the consent of the Bundesrat. GG art. 74a(2).
See 4 BVERFGE [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 115 (1954).
41

46

See generally W.

TH[ELE,

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES DEuTscHEN BERUFSBEAMTENTUMS

87-89 (1981). Furthermore, as with the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction (GG
art. 72(2)), the Republic may only enact framework laws to the extent a need exists
for federal regulation. GG art. 75. However, in some instances framework laws will
apply directly, that is, even in the absence of state legislation on the matter. See,
e.g., Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz (Public Officials Framework Law) ch. II (§§ 121133).
,1 GG art. 75(1). That provision would not apply to the extent that art. 74a does.
Framework laws may also be enacted to regulate the general principles of higher
education; the general legal relation of the press and film; hunting, conservation,
and care of the countryside; land distribution, regional planning, and water conservation; and matters relating to registration and identity cards. GG art. 75(la)(5).
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Officials Law) (BBG); the Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz (Public Officials Framework Law) (BRRG); and the Landesbeamtengesetz (State
Public Officials Law) of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia
48
(LBG(NRW)).
German law is divided into two branches: private law (Privatrecht)
and public law (6ffentliches Recht). Private law is in turn divided
into the general civil law (birgerliches Recht) and the special private
law (Sonderprivatrecht). General civil law includes, for example, contract and tort law (Schuldrecht), property law (Sachenrecht), matrimonial and family law (Familienrecht), and estates law (Erbrecht).
The special private law includes commercial law (Handelsrecht), "economic law" (Wirtschaftsrecht) (e.g., antitrust law), and, in part,
labor law (Arbeitsrecht).
Public law may be divided into four areas: constitutional law
(Staatsrecht) and international law (V61kerrecht); criminal law (Strafrecht); procedural law (Prozessrecht); and administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht). Administrative law is further divided into the general
administrative law (allegemeines Verwaltungsrecht) and the special
administrative law (besonderes Verwaltungsrecht), together with the
"social law" (Sozialrecht) (e.g., social security law) and tax law
(Steuerrecht). The law governing public officials (Beamtenrecht), including their ethical obligations, falls into the category of special
administrative law and consists of both federal and state statutes and

regulations .49
B. History of German Public Officials and German Public
Officials Laws
1. The Early Development and the Prussian General State Law
of 1794
"The history of German officialdom [Beamtentum] is a part of
the history of the modern concept of the state." 50 In contrast to

The Federal Republic of Germany is composed of ten states: Schleswig-Holstein,
Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, and the Saarland. West Berlin is accorded a
special status. North Rhine-Westphalia, with its capital at Disseldorf, has by far
the greatest population, accounting for almost 17 million of the Federal Republic's
61 million inhabitants.
49 See generally F. BAUR & G. WALTER, EINFOHRUNG IN DAs RECHT DER BuN49

DESREPUBLK DEUTSCHLAND

(5th ed. 1987).

so H. HATTENHAUER, GESCmCHTE DES BEAMTENTUMS 1

(1980). A

note on trans-

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 18:319

England and France, the German state arose not in the central
authority of a kingdom but rather through a varied process in the
territories of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation." Accordingly, "the birthplace of [German] officialdom was the territories"; and at the center of each territory was the residence of the
2

prince.1

In the medieval feudal state, vassals were bound by personal loyalty
to the feudal lord. From the 9th century, their position was de facto
inheritable.13 Over time, the fief became an office, and the vassal
became a public official.5 4 "Officials," as that term is now used, did
not exist, however, until the middle of the 17th century. After the
Thirty Years War (1618-1648), a transformation began in how the
constitution of the state was viewed, a transformation that slowly
led to the appointment of employees to fulfill purely governmental

functions .

5

lation: This article avoids translating "Beamte" as "civil servant" or "Beamtentum"
as "civil service," for in direct contrast to the American practice, where higher level
public servants, particularly in state and local government, are often exempt from
civil service protections and requirements, in Germany higher level public servants
are included among the Beamten. In addition, as noted below, post-war Germany
expressly rejected Allied attempts to reform German public service along American
civil service lines. Accordingly, "Beamte" is translated as "public official," and
"Beamtentum" as "public officialdom." "Public employee" is used in this article
to refer to lower level members of the German and American public service, whose
discretionary authority is, as a general rule, more circumscribed than that of public
officials; in the United States most "public employees," thus defined, are subject
to the civil service system. "Public servant" is used as a generic term to include all
members of the public service, including both public officials and public employees.
The term "public officers," which in the United States would normally include
elected as well as appointed officials, is not used in this article, except in references
to specific legislation that employs that term.
1I The borders of the Empire varied over the centuries, from the crowning of
the first German Kaiser, Otto the Great, in 962, to the renunciation of the imperial
title by Franz II in 1806 at the demand of Napoleon. See W. TR~uE, DEtrrscHE
GEscmcsn 76-77, 456-57 (3d ed. 1965). However, the Empire generally included
what is now Belgium, Luxembourg, northern Italy, Austria, western Czechoslovakia
(Bohemia and Moravia), the two Germanies, and, until 1648 when the Treaty of

Westphalia formally recognized their independence, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Id. at 287. See also C. McEVEDY, TH PENGUIN ATLAS OF MEDIEVAL HISTORY (1969).
52 HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 57. See also THIELE, supra note 46, at 12.

13G.

STRUNK, BEAMTENRECHT 1.

54 THIELE,

supra note 46, at 11, quoting Liermann, Beamtenethos - geschichtlich

gesehen,

ZITnsCmRwr FfR BEAMTENRECHT (ZBR) 240 (1960).
55 E. SCHUTZ & C.
ULLAND, 16 AMBROSIUS KOMMENTARE, BEAMTENRECHT
BUNDES UND DER LANDER 1 (1969). See generally TREUE, supra note 51, at

305.

DES
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Modern professional officialdom (Berufsbeamtentum) is a creation
of the authoritarian princes;5 6 its father is generally regarded as
Friedrich-Wilhelm I, King of Prussia (1713-1740).1 7 During his reign,
there arose a training program for public officials consisting of a set
period of preparatory service concluding with a comprehensive examination. 8 Thus, "[tihe roots of modern German administration
lie in Prussia." 5 9 Even so, officials performed their duties for the
king; service to the state, as that concept is understood today, did
not exist. 6°
As for written regulations for officials, among the earliest were
those from the Viennese Court of Emperor Maximilian I during the
late 15th and early 16th centuries; and in 1537 Prince Joachim II of
Brandenburg issued a regulation for palace officials, addressing, for
example, their duties and the length of their work day. 6' However,
the first comprehensive public officials law (Beamtenrecht) did not
appear until 1794, as part 2, title 10, of the Prussian General State
Law (Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht), entitled "On the Rights
and Duties of Servants of the State." "From that point, a public
official was no longer a servant of his prince but a servant of the
state." 62
The following principles of that Prussian law were particularly
important: public service is a career for life and is grounded not on
civil (private) law but on public law; the state may not unilaterally
terminate the employment of a public official; a separate disciplinary
law applies to public officials; and one receives an office only if
adequately qualified and after passing an examination. 6 As Professor
Willi Thiele, one of the preeminent scholars in the area, has noted,
one can state without exaggeration that this law provides a foundation

E. BRANDT (ed.), DIE POLITISCHE TREUEPFLICHT 37 (1976).
51D. APEL, J. KLUGHAMMER,& R. GEGINAT, BEAMTENRECHT 1 (1984); F.
BEAMTENRECHT 6 (1983). See also THIELE, supra note 46, at 16.
1sAPEL, supra note 57, at 1;SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 40.
36

19 H.

JACOB,

WAGNER,

GERMAN ADMINISTRATION SINCE BisMARK - CENTRAL AuTHORITy

VERSUS LocAL AUTONOMY 11 (1963).
6 WAGNER, supra note 57, at 6.
61 HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 57-61. During this same period, three theoretical works on government appeared that gained lasting importance in European
literature: Machiavelli's The Prince (1513), Thomas More's Utopia (1516), and
Erasmus of Rotterdam's Institutio Principis Christiani (1516). See generally HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 80-84.
62 APEL, supra note 57, at 1.
63 THIELE, supra note 46, at 23-24; H. ZErLER, BEAMTENRECHT 2 (1983); WAGNER,
supra note 57, at 7.
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and that all later legislation is only a certain process of revaluation
to accomplish refinements and improvements and to complete the
adaptation of public officialdom to 19th century constitutionalism
and 20th century parliamentary democracy. 64
The first public officials law to emerge as a separate statute appeared in Bavaria in 1805. 65 Other German states followed, from
Nassau in 1811 to Oldenburg in 1867.66 The Wiirttemberg Constitution
of 1819, in title IV, also regulated state service. That Constitution
provided that public officials were to be appointed by the king upon
recommendation of the appropriate council, which was to forward
to him the complete list of applicants; that no one should be appointed
who had not passed the required examination; that the oath of office
must require public officials to protect the constitution; that public
officials were not to be dismissed or transferred to a lesser position
without court order; that transfers without loss of position or pay
could be ordered for substantial reasons after a hearing by the head
of the department, but in such event moving expenses were guaranteed; that public assistance to public officials who, because of age
or illness, became unable to perform their jobs was to be regulated
by law; that decrees of the king relating to administration required
countersignature by the appropriate minister, who thereby accepted
responsibility for the matter; and that all public servants were responsible for determinations made within the area of their authority
and were required to comply with orders issued by a competent office
67
in accordance with established procedure.
2.

The Second (Bismarck) Reich (1871-1918)

With King Wilhelm's assumption of the imperial crown in Versailles
on January 18, 1871, and the adoption of the Reichs Constitution
of April 16, 1871, Germany became a unified nation, the "second
German empire." 6 On March 31, 1873, a "law relating to the legal
relationships of officials of the empire [Reichsbeamten]" was enacted. 69 Although that law governed only Reich's officials, who were
relatively few, and did not affect state laws or public officials of the
states, it acted as a harmonizing influence and remained in effect

supra note 46, at 22-23.
supra note 57, at 7; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 3.
66 HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 237-38.
67 Id. at 236-37.
61 See Reichsgesetzblatt ("RGBI.") 63 (1871); TREUE, supra note 51, at 600-601.
69 RGBI. 61 (1873). See generally HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 243-49.
'4

THIELE,

65 WAGNER,
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until its repeal by the Hitler regime on January 26, 1937 .70 Among
the duties of officials were included the conscientious discharge of
one's office in accordance with the constitution and laws; confidentiality; and refraining from outside business activities, from acceptance
of medals, income, or gifts from other governments, and from acceptance of gifts in relation to one's office. 7 1 Thus, comprehensive
ethics regulations for public officials, as part of a comprehensive
public officials law, have existed in Germany for more than a hundred
years.
During the second German empire, close association with opposition
parties was viewed as incompatible with a public official's duty of
political loyalty. Until 1914 a Social Democrat was an enemy of the
Reich and therefore could not become a public official. Indeed, not
only membership in the Social Democratic Party but even an acknowledgment that one held social democratic views was a violation
of an official's duty. Moreover, unlike other workers, officials were
72
not allowed to form associations.
3. The Weimar Republic (1919-1933) and the Reichs
Constitution of 1919
On November 28, 1918, seventeen days after the capitulation of
Germany brought an end to the First World War, Wilhelm II abdicated as German Kaiser and King of Prussia, thereby releasing all
Reich and Prussian public officials of their oath of loyalty. 73 However,
immediately upon taking office, Friedrich Ebert, the first president
of the Weimar Republic, requested public authorities and public
' 74
officials to offer the new government "a helping hand.
On August 11, 1919, the Reichs Constitution of the Weimar Republic was adopted. That document, in articles 128-131, specifically

70 STRUNK,

supra note 53, at 4;

HATTENHAUER,

supra note 50, at 247;

supra note 46, at 30. See RGB1. I, 39 (1937).
71 See A. BRAND, GESETZE UBER DEE RECHTSVERHALTNISSE

THIELE,

DER REICHSBEAMTEN

§§ 10-16 (3d ed. 1929) (commentary on Reichs public officials laws) (hereinafter
BRAND 1929). See generally HATTENHAuER, supra note 50, at 248.
72 BRANDT, supra note 56, at 75-76.
71 THIELE, supra note 46, at 40. See also TREuE, supra note 51, at 703.
7, THIELE, supra note 46, at 40; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 8. Ebert was elected
Reichs President on February 11, 1919, and on February 16 formed the first Reichs
Cabinet, with Scheidemann as Chancellor. That Cabinet was composed of the Weimar
Coalition of the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD), the German Democratic Party
(DDP), and the Center Party. TRuE, supra note 51, at 707.
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secured the rights of public officials, state and local as well as federal. 71
Those rights may be grouped into five general categories: job security,
protection of financial benefits, protection against undue pressure
from superiors or members of the public, rights of association, and
personal freedoms.
Security of the public official's job was guaranteed by appointment
for life (except as otherwise provided by law) and by a prohibition
against removal from office, temporary or permanent retirement, or
transfer to another office with less pay, except pursuant to law (Art.
129). Financial benefits were protected by a requirement that pensions
and survivor's benefits be regulated by law, by a right to assert
financial (monetary) claims before civil courts, and by the inviolability
of vested rights (Art. 129).
Protection against undue pressure from superiors or from members
of the public was provided by a right to appeal penalties or punishments (Art. 129), by the opportunity of an official to address unfavorable facts before they were entered into his or her personnel
file and the right to inspect his or her personnel file (Art. 129), and
by the guarantee that the state, rather than an individual official,
would bear the primary responsibility for violations of duty committed
by the official against a third party while carrying out official responsibilities (Art. 131; the state retained the right to seek indemnification from the official, and ordinary legal proceedings were
permissible.)
The 1919 Reichs Constitution also guaranteed to public officials
the right to form associations and provided that additional federal
regulations would be passed to authorize special representatives for
public officials (Art. 130). Finally, with respect to the personal rights
of public officials, the Constitution eliminated restrictions on women
public officials (Art. 128) and guaranteed freedom of political convictions (Art. 130).
With little change, almost all of these same rights were incorporated,
explicitly or implicitly, into West Germany's post-World War II
constitution and form the foundation of West Germany's current
public officials laws. Significantly, although the 1919 Reichs Constitution carefully set forth the rights of public officials, it made little

71 ScnifuTz, supra note 55, at 3. See also RGBI. 1383, 1407-1408 (1919). Articles
128-131 of the Weimar Republic's Reichs Constitution (hereinafter "1919 REIcHs-

VERF.") are also reproduced in

HATTENHA JER,

supra note 50, at 320-21.
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mention of the duties of public officials.76 One should hesitate to
read too much into that fact; rights may have been stressed more
than duties simply to underscore the Republic's commitment to the
traditional concept of a professional public officialdom. Yet the
emphasis in the 1919 Constitution of rights over duties illustrates
that in Germany, to a much greater extent than in the United States,
the growth of officials' rights paralleled the codification of specific
duties. Though officials' duties preceded officials' rights, perhaps by
centuries, legislation in Germany secured and codified those rights
at an early date. Accordingly, in Germany, unlike in the United
States, ethical obligations have, for at least two hundred years, of
necessity been viewed against the backdrop of the rights of public
officials.
Indeed, the only duty that the 1919 Reichs Constitution did impose
on public officials-an admonition that "officials are servants of the
whole, not of a party" (Art. 130)-came to mean increasingly little
in the face of the growing political turmoil within the Republic and
of the constitutional guarantee of "the freedom of [public officials']
political convictions." Although particularly significant in the development of professional officialdom, the granting of that freedom
had serious consequences for the Republic. 77 Off the job, officials
could be monarchists or opponents of democracy and could even
belong to the communist party or the National Socialist German
7
Workers' Party (NSDAP). 1
In fact, throughout the life of the Weimar Republic, the desires
of political parties weighed ever heavier in the decisions of public
officials, at least of those public officials who had been appointed
with party backing; yet in the end, all parties but one were abolished,
and the NSDAP assumed dictatorial control of officials' actions, with
the consequent destruction of individual liberties. 79 That lesson-of
76 See

1919 REICHSVERF. art. 128-13 1. See also HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at

321.

77 ZEILER, supra note 63, at 3.
7 WAGNER, supra note 57, at 9. See also THIELE, supra note 46, at 43-51.
79 See generally THIELE, supra note 46, at 43-67; HATTENHAUJER, supra note 50,
at 325-28, 369-413; H. MOMMSEN, BEAMTENTUM IMDRTTEN REICH (1966) (the leading
work on public officials in Nazi Germany); E. FoRSTHoFF, I LEHRBUCH DES VER-

WALTUNGSRECHTS 37-38 (10th ed. 1973) (noting the danger in the Weimar Republic
that "party membership rather than professional qualifications would be decisive
for the filling of public officials positions, that in general the spoils system would

win the upper hand, a system existing in the United States but foreign to German
traditions").
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the potentially devastating impact that results from mixing party
politics and public office-seems largely to have been forgotten by
those American politicians who now decry restrictions on patronage
and on political party activity by public officials.
Despite the generous treatment afforded public officials by the 1919
Reichs Constitution, they maintained a reserved attitude toward the
Republic, for their personal bond to the monarchy, the primary basis
for the relationship of service and loyalty, had vanished. To the fears
and uncertainties that arose at the end of the First World War was
added the apprehension of public officials that the new state could
infringe on the concept of professional public officialdom (Berufsbeamtentum), perhaps by placing all public servants on the same level
or by requiring that public officials be elected to office.w0
Following the Kapp Putsch (a monarchical coup) in March 1920,
the assassination of Matthias Erzberger (a Center Party representative
to the Reichstag) in August 1921, and the murder of Walther Ratenau
(a Jewish industrialist and cabinet minister) on June 24, 1922, a
"Decree for the Protection of the Republic" was promulgated on
June 26 and 29, 1922, followed by a "Law for the Protection of
the Republic" on July 21, 1922.81 That law added a new section 10a
to the Weimar Republic's public officials law, providing in part that,
"when carrying out his official duties, a Reich's public official is
8 2
obligated to support the constitutional republican government.1
Even so, the official could still belong to anti-Republic associations.8 s
"Many observers see in [this boundless tolerance] one of the grounds
that in the end led to the destruction of the first German democracy,'"' and thus to the rise of the fascist Third Reich.
4. The Third Reich (1933-1945) and the German Public
Officials Law of 1937
As economic and political turmoil in the Republic continued to
grow, so did the power of the Nazi Party. On January 30, 1933,
President Hindenburg named Adolf Hitler Reichs Chancellor. Less
than a month later, on February 28, 1933 (the day following the
burning of the Reichstag) Hindenburg, pursuant to Article 48(2) of

supra note 57, at 8; STRtNK, supra note 53, at 4.
11W. THIELE, supra note 46, at 46; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 8. See generally
W. TRE E, supra note 51, at 710-11.
82 RGBI. 585 (1922) (law). See also RGBI. 521, 532 (1922) (decree).
'o WAGNER,

'3

84

TrmsL,

Id.

supra note 46, at 47.

1988]

U.S.-GERMAN

PUBLIC ETHICS LAW

the 1919 Reichs Constitution, suspended the rights of free speech,
free press, and assembly, the secrecy of the post, telegraph, and
telephone, and restrictions on searches and seizures. That decree,
which remained in effect throughout the Third Reich, "formed the
true basis of the Hitler dictatorship and lent it an appearance of

legality.'

'85

Following the Reichstag elections of March 5, 1933, which gave
the Nazis only 44% of the vote, the Reichstag and Reichsrat, on
March 24, passed an enabling act ("Law for the Elimination of the
Peril to People and Reich' ")86 granting the government dictatorial
powers for four years, including the right to pass laws, even laws
inconsistent with the Constitution, without action by the Reichstag.
Since only the socialist party voted against it, the Act garnered the
two-thirds vote of the Reichstag necessary to change the Constitution.
the Nazi party to be the
On July 14, 1933, a federal law declared
87
Germany.
in
party
political
legal
only
From the outset, the Nazis recognized the importance of the public
administration and public officials to the party's aim of achieving
absolute dictatorial control of the nation. Indeed, as its first major
legislative act, the Nazi regime, on April 7, 1933, enacted a "Law
for Restoration of the Professional Public Officialdom" (Gesetz zur
Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums) in order to purge the civil
government of actual or potential opponents and to make way for
valued national socialists.88 That law applied to federal, state, and
local officials, including retired officials, and permitted their dismissal
without regard to existing law (section 1). The Act targeted three
groups of officials: those who had entered service since November
9, 1918, without the required qualifications or "other aptitude" (that
is, communist officials and so-called "party book" officials, who
were generally regarded as having obtained their office as a result
of party patronage) (section 2); officials who, because of their previous
political activity, could not. be counted on to intercede at all times
for the national state (section 4); and officials who were not of Aryan
descent (i.e. Jews-that is, persons with at least one Jewish grandparent) (section 3).89

's
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TREUE, supra note 51, at 729-30.
RGBI. I, 141 (1933).
See generally T.EuE, supra note 51, at 730-32.

s8 MOMMSEN,

supra note 79, at 39;

BRANDT,

supra note 56, at 108;

STRUNK,

supra note 53, at 5-6. See RGBI. I, 175 (1933).
RGB1. I, 175 (1933). See generally HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 378-79.
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The law has been characterized as "one of the most important
instruments in [Hitler's] seizure of power." 90 Savage in its effect, the
law resulted even in the dismissal of blind Jewish employees of a
state institution for the blind. "Ruthlessness became a virtue." 91 More
important than the termination of employees, however, was the intimidating effect the Act had upon public officials, who were now
all the more careful to conduct themselves in a politically unimpeachable manner. 92
Three months later, on June 30, 1933, the regime enacted the
"Public Officials Law Amendments Act" (Beamtenrechtsanderungsgesetz), which added a new section la to the Reichsbeamtengesetz of
March 31, 1873. 93 That new section prohibited the appointment of
any official who was a non-Aryan, who was married to a non-Aryan,
or who could not be counted on "to intercede, without reservation,
at all times for the national state." 94 On January 30, 1934, the New
Organizational Law (Neuaufbaugesetz) removed the distinction between Reichs officials and state officials, thereby making all public
officials servants of the Third Reich; and on August 1, 1934, the
Head of State Law (Staatsoberhauptgesetz) designated the Fihrer as
the sole head of all German officials. 95 Thenceforth, all German
public officials were bound by this oath: "I swear that I will be loyal
and obedient to the Fihrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf
Hitler, complying with the laws and conscientiously fulfilling my
duties of office, so help me God."9 "[U]nconditional, blind obedience
thereby became a virtue for public officials." 97
Finally, on January 26, 1937, the Third Reich enacted a new German
Public Officials Law (Deutsches Beamtengesetz ("DBG")), 98 the only
substantial legislative work of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior in
this area. 99 Ironically, that law enjoys a special rank in the history of
German public officialdom. 100 Despite the heavy overlay of Nazi prin-

90 HATTENHAUER,

supra note 50, at 377.

91 Id.
92

Id.

93 RGBI. I, 433, 434 (1933).
94 Id. See generally THIELE, supra note 46, at 53-57.
95 See RGBI. I, 75 (1934); RGBI. I, 747 (1974); THIELE, supra note 46, at 57.
Gesetz iber die Vereidigung der Beamten und der Wehrmacht vom 20. August
1934, RGB1. 1, 785 (1934). See generally THIELE, supra note 46, at 57-60.
96

9" WAGNER,

supra note 57, at 9.

98 RGBl. I, 39 (1937).
99 MOMMSEN, supra note 79, at 91.
'00 WAGNER,

supra note 57, at 9;

THELE,

supra note 46, at 61.
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ciples, the Act contains the core of a modern public officials law for
a democratic state-for example, with respect to the rights and duties
of officials-as demonstrated by the decision of the occupying forces
to continue the DBG in effect, without the Nazi contents.10'
Accordingly, the DBG deserves discussion, both for its importance
to the development of German public officials laws and for the warnings
it provides to the drafter of a modern ethics code for public officials.
As noted above, the Reichs Public Officials Law of March 31, 1873,
which remained in effect until repealed by the. DBG in 1937, contained
the first comprehensive regulation of the duties of public officials. The
second chapter of the DBG (§§ 3-20) greatly refined the statement of
those duties, regulating, for example, the oath of office (§ 4), conflicts
of interest (§ 5), confidentiality (§§ 8-9), outside business activities (§§
10- 11), gifts (§ 15), working hours (§ 16), vacations (§ 17), and uniforms
(§ 20). The third chapter of the DBG (§§ 21-23) addressed the consequences of failing to fulfill those duties. The DBG also regulated
appointment and transfer (§§ 24-35); protection of the legal position
of officials (§§ 36-42); provisional retirement (§§ 43-49); termination
of the relationship between the official and the state (§§ 50-78); and
payments to retired and provisionally retired officials, death and survivor's benefits, and assistance in the event of an accident (§§ 79-141).
As before, salaries were regulated in a separate law. 1°2
However, to make it consistent with national socialist tenets, the
DBG contained a heavy Nazi overlay, incorporating elements from
earlier Nazi laws regulating public officials. Indeed, in its preamble,
the DBG stated that: "A professional public officialdom, rooted in
the German people, permeated with the national socialist world view,
and bound in loyalty to the Fihrer of the German Reich and people,
Adolf Hitler, forms a foundation pillar of the national socialist state."' 0 3
That statement has been characterized as "radically contradicting all
of the tradition of German public officials."' 0 4
10, See E. WICHERT, BUNDESBEAMTENRECHT 1-5 (1950) (public officials laws and
implementing regulations); THIELE, supra note 46, at 61-62; BRANDT, supra note 56,

at 131-32;

SCHEERBARTH,

supra note 1, at 45; SCHUTZ, supra note 55, at 3.

Reichsbesoldungsgesetz, RGBI. I, 349 (1927), as amended throughout the
Third Reich. See also SCHOTZ, supra note 55, at 2-3.
I03 RGB1. I, 39, 41 (1937).
104See THIELE, supra note 46, at 62. See generally A. BRAND, DAS DEUTSCHE
BEAMTENGESETZ 62-66 (4th ed. 1942) (hereafter BRAND 1942) (commentary on DBG).
Impervious to irony, Professor Brand, in his commentary on that preamble, quoted
Hitler's Mein Kampf: "The body of German public officials and the administrative
apparatus is ... particularly distinguished by its independence from individual
governments." Id. at 63.
102 See
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The Nazi overlay was not merely cosmetic. For example, the first
section of the DBG proclaimed that German public officials stood in
a relationship of service and loyalty to the Fiihrer and the Reich, based
on public law; that German public officials were the implementors of
the will of the State that was sustained by the NSDAP; and that the
State exacted from public officials unquestioning obedience and uttermost performance of duty, in return for which the State secured
for the official his position for life. 1°5 The official was to be "until
death loyal to the Fuhrer" and to "intercede, without reservation, at
all times for the national socialist State" (§ 3). Doubt about one's
willingness thus to intercede for the Nazi state precluded appointment
and justified early "retirement" (§§ 26(1), (3) and 71(1)). Indeed, on
April 26, 1942, the Reichstag decreed that the Fulhrer, without regard
to any existing law, could at any time remove any German public
official from his office or position.3 6 "Officials had completely lost
all rights."' 7
The DBG's treatment of Jews was consistent with the Niirnberg
Laws. 10 8 Section 25 of the DBG permitted only those of German or
race-related blood, and with spouses of German or race-related blood,
to become public officials (an exception could be allowed where the
spouse was a "half-breed of the second degree").10 9 Under section 59,
an official who married a Jew without permission would be discharged." 0
5. The Federal Republic of Germany
Following the capitulation of the fascist German regime in May
1945, the allied forces formed an Allied Control Committee, which
on June 5 assumed complete control throughout Germany. Although
that Committee made no changes in the DBG directly, denazification
101
DBG § 1. See generally

BRAND

1942, at 77-88.

See RGBI. I, 247 (1942).
107

BRANDT, supra

note 56, at 109.

108 Reichsbiirgergesetz

["Reichs Citizens Law"] vom 15. September 1935, RGBI.
I, 1146 (1935), and Gesetz zum Schuitze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen
Ehre ["Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor"] vom 15.
September 1935, RGBI. I, 1146 (1935), called the "Nirnberg Laws" because they
were enacted by the Reichstag in Niirnberg. See B. Blau, 1 Das Ausnahmerecht fiir

die Juden in den europaischen Ldndern, 1933-1945 29 (1952).
109See

generally BRAND 1942, at 328-35; H. WrrTnAND, 1 BEAMTENRECHTLICHE

GESETZF Al10-19 (2d ed. 1943) (containing relevant implementing regulations for

the DBG and the Nfirnberg Laws).
110 See also DBG § 72. See generally BRAND 1942, at 515-18 and 469-70.
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laws had the effect of amending the DBG to remove the Nazi overlay. 11
The British and American occupation forces sought, but failed, to
establish a German public officers law on the Anglo-Saxon civil service
model, and in particular to abolish, at least in part, the distinctions
2
between public officials, public employees, and public laborers" distinctions discussed below.
After the collapse of the Third Reich, the newly created states
accepted as state officials those former Third Reich public officials
who were permitted to continue in office, and, under authority of the
occupying powers, established the legal relationships of those officials."' Those state laws in part substantially changed the DBG and
differed from state to state." 4 Hesse's state constitution of 1946 even
established a single labor law for public officials, public employees,
and public laborers." 5 Thus, before 1950 the following German states
enacted their own public officials laws (Beamtengesetze): Bavaria (October 28, 1946), Wirttemberg-Baden (November 19, 1946), Hesse (June
25, 1948) (reestablishing the traditional role of public officials), Rhineland-Palatinate (December 13, 1949), and Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern
7
(April 8, 1949).16 In the other states, the DBG continued to apply."
On May 23, 1949, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany became effective."8 Article 33 of that Constitution, discussed
in detail below, provides that "as a rule, only members of the public
service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty governed by
public law shall be assigned, as an ongoing responsibility, the exercise
of governmental authority," and that "public service law shall be
regulated with due regard to the traditional principles of the profes-

See WICHERT, supra note 101, at 1-7.
See STRUNK, supra note 53, at 6-7; HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 470-74;
SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 46; THiELE, supra note 46, at 71-72; WAGNER, supra
note 57, at 10-11; APEL, supra note 57, at 1. See also Law No. 15 of the Military
Government (March 15, 1949). The German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
abolished the institution of the professional public officialdom and the distinction
between public officials, public employees, and public laborers. See F. KuNz, AR112

A BLS Z 235 (Staatsverlag der DDR 1983); SCHEERBARTH, supra note
1, at 46, 581-86; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 7.
"I THIELE, supra note 46, at 89.
114 Id. at 86, 89.
-15Art. 29(1). See STRUNK, supra note 53, at 6; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 11;
APEL, supra note 57, at 1.
BEITSRECHT VON

116 See, respectively, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt [GVB1.] Nr. 24; Regierungsblatt
[RegBl.] Nr. 22; GVBI. Nr. 20; GVBI. Nr. 80; RegBl. 169.
'"

THIELE,

supra note 46, at 73.

I" BGBI. 1 (1949).
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sional public officialdom." Article 137 permits restrictions on the right
of public officials to run for office.
The Federal Public Officials Law (Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG)), also
discussed at length below, was enacted on July 14, 1953, effective
September 1, 1953. 19 However, it applied only to federal public officials, not to state or local public officials. Indeed, in a subsequent
dispute over the validity of the North Rhine-Westphalia law on salaries
of public officials (Besoldungsgesetz), the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), on December 1, 1954, held that in this
area the federal government could only establish a framework law
(Rahmengesetz), pursuant to Article 75(1) of the Constitution; the
Republic possessed no concurrent jurisdiction with the states in matters
relating to state and local public officials.'2 As noted above, in matters
where its jurisdiction is limited to enacting a framework law, the
federal government may not preclude the states from enacting other
21
legislation consistent with the federal framework.
Wishing to prevent German public officials law from developing in
different directions as a result of diverging state laws, the federal
government enacted, on July 1, 1957, a public officials law (Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz (BRRG)) that provided a framework for state
public officials laws.'2 That framework law, which not surprisingly
bears a strong resemblance to the federal public officials law (BBG),
restored the uniformity of German public officials laws, at least in

fundamental areas .123
III.

THE PUBLIC LAW CONTEXT OF GERMAN ETHICS LAws: THE
AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS OF GERMAN PUBLIC OFFICIALS

A.

An Overview of Ethics Laws for German Public Officials

It is not the purpose of this article to compare the substantive
ethical obligations of German and American public officials; that

19

BGBI. I, 551, 585 (1953).

120

See 4 BVERFGE 115 (1954). See generally THIELE, supra note 46, at 87-89. The

court's decision, with respect to state compensation laws, was overruled by the 1971
Constitutional amendment noted above. See GG art. 74a.
121 4 BVERFGE 115 (1954).
122 BGBI. I, 667 (1957).
123 TIELE, supra note 46, at 89. Public officials, or at least certain kinds of public
officials, are subject to a number of other federal and state laws, such as laws
regulating salaries (Besoldungsgesetze), discipline (Disziplinarordnungen), and representation (Personalvertretungsgesetze), and laws regulating public police officials
and college teachers. See generally SCHOTZ, supra note 55, at 4-6.
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comparison must await another day. Yet a passing familiarity with
those laws is necessary for an understanding of the public law context
of German ethics laws.
The ethical obligations of German public officials are embodied
in the chapter of German public officials laws entitled "Duties"
(Pflichten). 124 Although Germany has traditionally regulated some
aspects of the lives of its public officials to an extent unthinkable
in the United States, 125 most of the ethical obligations of German
public officials would not be out of place in American ethics statutes.
German public officials laws restrict political activity, outside employment, self-dealing, and receipt of gifts, and require that public
officials maintain the confidentiality of information and avoid conflicts of interest.

26

124 BBG §§ 52-76; BRRG §§ 35-44a, 124; LBG(NRW) §§ 55-82. The consequences
of failing to fulfill those duties are set forth in BBG §§ 77-78, BRRG §§ 45-47,
and LBG(NRW) §§ 83-84. See also BBG § 60, BRRG § 41, LBG(NRW) § 63
(provisional suspension). See generally U. BATTIS, BUNDESBEAMTENGESETZ 302-439
(1980) (commentary on BBG); A. BOCHALLI, LANDESBEAMTENGESETZ VON NoRDR1IuNWESTFALEN 128-86 (2d ed. 1963) (commentary on LBG(NRW)); SCHOTZ, supra note
55, at 292-499 (same); W. WIESE, BEAMTENRECHT 102-64 (1979); SCHEERBARTH, supra
note 1, at 170-71, 344-68; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 95-104; I. VON MfTNCH (ed.),
BESONDERES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 37-46 (7th ed. 1985); APEL, supra note 57, at 4853; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 81-94; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 60-94; H. SCHNELLENBACH, BEAMTENRECHT IN DER PRAXsS 87-117 (2d ed. 1987); R. B6TTCHER, DIE

POLITISCHE TREUPFLICHT DER BEAMTEN UND SOLDATEN UND DIE GRUNDRECHTE DER

KOMMUNIKATION (1967).
12, For example, "[a public official's] conduct, both on and off the job, must do
justice to the respect and trust that his profession requires" (BBG § 54, BRRG §
36, LBG(NRW) § 57). "His entire conduct must be such that it will also not violate
the unwritten rules of honor, propriety, and decency to the extent his official position
so requires .... 2" SCHTZ, supra note 55, at 309 (commentary on LBG(NRW) §
57). Thus, for example, although in principle adultery is no longer a breach of duty,
it has been held that entering into a notoriously adulterous relationship with the
wife of a colleague is. See BATTIS, supra note 124, at 321 (commentary on BBG §
54). But cf. BATTIS, supra note 124, at 318-20; BBG § 77(1) ("Conduct of a public
official off the job is a breach of duty if that conduct, under the circumstances of
the individual case, is particularly likely to impair respect and trust in a way that
is significant for his office or for the appearance of public officialdom"). With
respect to American federal government counterparts to those provisions, see 5
U.S.C. § 7352 (1982) (excessive and habitual use of intoxicants); 5 C.F.R. § 735.207
(1988) (indebtedness); 5 C.F.R. § 735.209 (1988) ("An employee shall not engage
in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or
other conduct prejudicial to the Government"); Exec. Order No. 12564, 51 F.R.
32889 (1986), reprinted following 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 (West 1988 Supp.) (Drug-Free
Federal Workplace); Federal Employee Substance Abuse Education and Treatment
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-157 (1986).
,16Also included among the duties of German public officials is a requirement
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PoliticalNeutrality and Political Activities

A German public official "serves the entire people, not a party.
He shall fulfill his duties lawfully and in a nonpartisan manner and

that public officials dedicate themselves with complete devotion to their profession.
BBG § 54; BRRG § 36; LBG(NRW) § 57. They must take an oath of office (BBG
§ 58; BRRG § 40; LBG(NRW) § 61), a requirement that Germans have traditionally
taken quite seriously.
In view of Germany's fascist experience, BBG §§ 55 and 56 are of particular
interest. BBG § 55 requires that public officials advise and support their superiors
and carry out superiors' orders. See also BRRG § 37; LBG(NRW) § 58. However,
a public official "bears complete personal responsibility for the lawfulness of his
official acts," unless, as he is required to do, he promptly brings the question of
the legality of an order to the attention of his immediate superior and that immediate
superior's superior, and both superiors affirm the order's lawfulness; in that event,
the public official must obey the order, unless it requires the official to commit a
criminal act or violation (Ordnungswidrigkeit) or unless the order violates human
dignity. BBG § 56. See also BRRG § 38 and LBG(NRW) § 59.
The duties of federal and North-Rhine Westphalia public officials also include an
average work week of forty hours; when compelling circumstances require it, officials
must work additional hours without compensation, provided that such additional
work is the exception, and further provided that compensatory time must be given
when ordered or approved overtime exceeds five hours in any one month. BBG §
72; Working Hours Regulation for Federal Public Officials of Sept. 24, 1974, as
amended (Arbeitszeitverordnung), § 1(1); BRRG § 44; LBG(NRW) § 78-78a. Public
officials must avoid unexcused absences (BBG § 73; BRRG § 47; LBG(NRW) § 79),
must select a residence sufficiently close to their work so as "not to impair the
orderly performance of [their] official duties" (BBG § 74; LBG(NRW) § 80), must
remain, even off the job, in the vicinity of their place of work if required by
compelling circumstances (BBG § 75; LBG(NRW) § 81), and, if required, must wear
a uniform (see BBG § 76; LBG(NRW) § 82).
The consequences of failing to perform one's duties as a public official are
addressed in BBG §§ 77-78 and Bundesdisziplinarordnung of July 20, 1967, as
amended; BRRG §§ 45-47; LBG(NRW) §§ 83-84 and Disziplinarordnung des Landes
Nordrhein-Westfalen (DO NW) of May 1, 1981, as amended. See also laws and
regulations reprinted in BUNDESBEAMTENGESETZE No. 30-43 (Beck 1986) (federal),
and H. REioRN (ed.), GESETZE DES LANDES NORDRHEIN-WEsTFALEN No. 40-40c
(Beck 1987) (North Rhine-Westphalia). See generally WiEsE, supra note 124, at 12564; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 79-94; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 405-16; K.
EBERT, DAS RECHT DES 6FFENTLICHEN DIENSTES 97-110 (1965); BATTIS, supra note
124, at 414-39; voN MtYNCH, supra note 124, at 43-46; ZEILER, supra note 63, at
100-104; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 91-94; APEL, supra note 57, at 53, 107-14.
With respect to the restrictions upon the individual constitutional rights of public
officials, "[o]n the one hand, it cannot be doubted that in principle constitutional
rights (GG art. 2ff.) also demand recognition in the public official relationship. On
the other hand, the sphere of duties of a public official limits the . . . possibilities
for making use of those rights." SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 87. Those
limitations, however, are narrowly interpreted. See generally SCINELLENBACH, supra
note 124, at 87-99; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 32-43; VoN MfuNCH, supra note 124,
at 57-64; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 37-50; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 107-110.
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shall conduct his office with regard for the welfare of the whole.'
This "duty of neutrality," together with the other duties specified
in the BBG, implements the public official's constitutional duty of
service and loyalty, 12 and applies not only with respect to partisan
politics but also with respect to special interest groups, such as
unions. 29 The Germans have recognized that party patronage seriously
undermines the ability of a public official to remain neutral, 30 a
conclusion that many American politicians still reject. Indeed, the
public official "must avoid even the appearance of being politically
partisanbased on objective circumstances, without regard to the actual
subjective position of the public official."' 31
Off the job, a public official may engage in political activities, but
in doing so must "maintain that moderation and discretion required
by his position vis 4 vis the whole and by respect for the duties of
his office.' '132 Thus, for example, although public officials are by
law entitled to time off to run for the Bundestag, 3 3 upon election
they must resign their position as a public official. 3
Broad pronouncements that a public official must "serve the entire
people," fulfill his or her duties "lawfully and in a nonpartisan
manner," and maintain a relationship of "service and loyalty" to

127

BBG § 52(1); BRRG § 35(1); LBG(NRW) § 55. See also 1919

REIclsvERr.

130; VON MUTNCH, supra note 124, at 40.
121 See BATTIS, supra note 124, at 303-304. The public official "must, by his entire
conduct, acknowledge the free and democratic basic order, in the constitutional
sense, and intercede to preserve it." BBG § 52(2); BRRG § 35(1); LBG(NRW) §
55(2). See also WEIMAR RBG art. 10a; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 95-96. "The service
of the whole, which characterizes the public official's relationship, prohibits strikes
by public officials." ZEILER, supra note 63, at 6. See also id. at 97; WIEsE, supra
note 124, at 107. Indeed, the German Federal Constitutional Court has held unconstitutional the assertion of any right of public officials to strike. 8 BVERFGE 1,
17 (1958). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982) (loyalty and striking); Code of Ethics for
Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted
following 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 (West 1980) ("Any person in Government service
should: 1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty
to persons, party, or Government Department. 2. Uphold the Constitution, laws,
and legal regulations of the United States and of all governments therein and never
be a party to their evasion").
129 BATTIS, supra note 124, at 306; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 96.
130 See ZEILER, supra note 63, at 96.
131 WlESE, supra note 124, at 110 (emphasis in original), citing 43 BVERwGE
[Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court] 42 (1969).
132 BBG § 53. See also BRRG § 35(2); LBG(NRW) § 56.
133 BBG § 89(2). See also BRRG § 33(1); LBG(NRW) § 101(3).
134BBG § 57. See also BRRG §§ 33(3), 34; AbgG(NRW) § 31. See generally
SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 170-78.
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the state are appropriate to a civil law country but hardly sufficient
to regulate the conduct of American public officials, even assuming
that such broad statutory language would pass constitutional muster.
Yet when discussing with municipal officials the restrictions on political activity contained in the draft Municipal Ethics Act of the
New York State Commission on Government Integrity, this writer
was unable adequately to articulate the reasons for those restrictions
because at that time he failed to appreciate either their relationship
to other ethics law provisions or to public administrative law as a
whole. In contrast to the Hatch Act and its antecedents, which were
135
enacted largely in response to political corruption and ethical crises,
the German model provides, at least by analogy, both theoretical
underpinnings for restrictions on the political activity of public officials and a means of integrating those restrictions into the larger
36
body of public administrative law.

- See generally Biller v. United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 863 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1988):
The advent of Jacksonian democracy witnessed the rise of partisan politics
and political corruption, a trend that continued and increased up to and
after the Civil War and culminated in the Grant administration ....
Public
outcry against the 'spoils system,' by which federal jobs were doled out to
reward political loyalty, prompted the executive branch attempt to eliminate
this pernicious system. Presidents Grant in 1873 and Hayes in 1877 issued
executive orders to mandate political neutrality for federal employees. Neither order succeeded ....
Congress . . . enacted in December of 1882 the
Pendleton or Civil Service Act, which President Arthur signed into law in
January, 1883.... This Act aimed to diminish political partisanship in
federal hiring and to limit political activity by federal civil service employees.
Early in this century, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an Executive
Order forbidding anyone 'in the competitive classified service' from taking
'active part in political management or in political campaigns.'. . This
Executive Order remained in effect until enactment of the Hatch Act....
The Hatch Act was originally enacted in 1939, . . . and amended in 1940,
...as a response to disclosures of improper political practices among the
Works Progress Administration (W.P.A.) and other relief agencies during
the 1938 election campaign.
Id. at 1084-85.
136 This is not to say that German scholars do not sometimes overindulge their
penchant for theoretical foundations, a temptation to which even student extremists
submit. When this writer studied in Germany, during the heyday of the student
movement, the story was told of an American student radical in Berlin who was
shocked by the refusal of his German colleagues to demonstrate against the impending
demolition of a playground for workers' children until the students had firmly
grounded their proposed action in Marxist-Leninist dogma. By that time the playground was gone. This article does not propose that American lawmakers thus treat
the adoption of ethics laws. Rather, it suggests that American legislators' haphazard
approach to those laws could benefit from a thoughtful attempt to analyze ethics
statutes in the light of the larger purposes of public administrative law as a whole.
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Confidentiality

American ethics laws often require that public officials maintain
the confidentiality of all non-public information they obtain during
the course of their duties. 37 The German public officials laws hold
such confidentiality in particularly high regard. 138 "The duty of confidentiality of office [Amtsverschwiegenheit] is, along with the duty
of loyalty, the duty of obedience, and the duty of complete devotion
of one's labor, one of the basic duties of the relationship of a public
official."' 3 9 Their lifelong obligation of confidentiality even prohibits
German public officials, in certain limited circumstances, from disclosing confidential information in testimony before a court. 14 German public officials, or their heirs or next of kin, must also, upon
request, return all copies of any documents in their possession that
14
relate to the official's office. '
In the United States a tension exists between freedom of information
laws, which promote public access to government documents, and
the government's need for confidentiality. Although the United States
has a stronger tradition of openness in government than does Germany, that relationship between openness and privacy could profitably
be examined in light of the German approach to the problem.
3.

Self-dealing, Conflicts of Interest, and Gifts

German public officials laws contain a general prohibition of conflicts of interest: "[A public official] shall administer his office in
good conscience without benefit to himself."' 42 Significantly, that
admonition is viewed as an extension of the prohibition against public
officials acting in a partisan manner. 43 In other words, from the
German perspective a public official who acts in the interest of a
political party (or a special interest group) has engaged in a conflict
117 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN.
LAw § 805-a(l)(b) (McKinney 1988) (no municipal
officer or employee shall "disclose confidential information acquired by him in the
course of his official duties or use such information to further his personal interests");
NML MODEL § 19; N.Y. ST. CoMM'N DRAr § 4(1)0). See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.206,
735.303 (prohibiting use of nonpublic information to further private interests).
138 See generally WEsE, supra note 124, at 114-18.

139

EBERT,

supra note 126, at 93.

BBG §§ 61(2), 62; BRRG § 39(2)-(4); LBG(NRW) §§ 64(2), 65. See also BBG
§ 63 and LBG(NRW) § 66 (both providing that information may be given to the
press only by the head of an agency or by his or her designated representatives).
14'
BG § 61(3); LBG(NRW) § 64(3).
142 BBG § 54; BRRG § 36; LBG(NRW) § 57.
140

143

See

BATTIS,

supra note 124, at 317;

EBERT,

supra note 126, at 85.
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of interest that is just as serious as the conflict of interest committed
by the public official who takes an official action for his or her own
personal gain. That conclusion would come as a revelation to many
American legislators, who tend to regard acting for one's own gain
as a much more serious offense than acting on behalf of one's party.
In Germany, there is no distinction.
According to Professor Ulrich Battis, one of the leading commentators on the BBG, BBG § 54 "[plrohibits not only the acceptance
of small gifts or other advantages that do not fulfill the elements of
common bribery[, unless prior approval has been granted pursuant
to BBG § 70,] but even conduct that suffices only to raise the suspicion
of corruption."'" German public officials are thus subject to a standard not unlike the "appearance of impropriety" standard applicable

to American attorneys. 145
Indeed, even under current law, American public officials who are
also attorneys-for example, former Attorney General Edwin Meeseare bound by two sets of ethical obligations: those ethics laws governing all public officials and the applicable code of conduct for the
legal profession. Thus, "[a] lawyer .who is a public officer, whether
full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal
or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with
his official duties."' 46 Furthermore, "[a] lawyer who holds public
office shall not ... [u]se his public position to obtain, or attempt
to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or
for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that
' 47
such action is not in the public interest.' 1
Consideration must be given to whether similar requirements, and
an "appearance of impropriety" standard, should not be applied to
all American public officials, provided that the concomitant rights
of the officials are properly secured. Such a proposal is, in fact,
hardly revolutionary. The International City Management Association
(ICMA) subjects its members, appointed professional municipal ad-

'" BATTIS,
145

supra note 124, at 317.

See, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBiLITY, Canon 9 ("A

lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety"). That Canon
specifically restricts the revolving door activities of attorneys who have served as
public officials: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee." DR (Disciplinary
Rule) 9-101(B).
146 Id., EC (Ethical Consideration) 8-8.
141 Id., DR 8-101(A)(1).
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ministrators, to a code of ethics that is at least as stringent as lawyers'
48
codes.
The obligation of German public officials to administer their office
without benefit to themselves is secured by the protections of BBG
§ 59,149 which provides:

(1) The public official shall be excluded from taking any' official
actions that would affect him or a relative adversely.
(2) "Relative," within the meaning of paragraph (1), means persons
for whose benefit the public official possesses, as a result of lawful
familial relationships, a testimonial privilege in criminal proceedings.
(3) Laws that prohibit a public official from engaging in specific
official actions remain unaffected. 50
This provision is the obverse of BBG § 54 and is intended to protect
public officials from "conflicts of conscience" that would arise if
the officials were required to take an action disadvantageous to
themselves or their families.' 5' Section 59 recognizes that inaction by
a public official, in order to avoid a detriment to the official, may
present a conflict of interest that is just as significant as an action
by an official to obtain a benefit. American ethics laws rarely address
52
that issue, at least directly.

See ICMA CODE OF ETlucs, reprinted in 69 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, August
1987, at 12-13. Other organizations have promulgated codes regulating specific types
of municipal officials, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
the Building Officials & Code Administrator's International, Inc., and the American
Association of School Administrators. Cf. Code of Ethics for Government Service,
H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted following 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7301 (West 1980); 5 C.F.R. § 735.201a ("An employee shall avoid any action,
whether or not specifically prohibited by this subpart, which might result in, or
create the appearance of: (a) Using public office for private gain; (b) Giving preferential treatment to any person; (c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
(d) Losing complete independence or impartiality; (e) Making a Government decision
outside official channels; or (f) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in
the integrity of the Government").
149 BATTIs, supra note 124, at 317.
15OBBG § 59. Accord: LBG(NRW) § 62. Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law
(Strafprozessordnung (StPO)) § 52(1), those individuals constituting "relatives" are:
a fiance or fiancee; a spouse or former spouse; direct ancestors and descendants by
blood or marriage; and certain other persons closely related by blood or marriage.
See also Civil Code (Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)) §§ 1589-1590.
"I,See EBERT, supra note 126, at 85.
152 The proposed Municipal Ethics Act of the N.Y. State Commission on Government Integrity does prohibit public officials from "refrain[ing] from taking any
4,8

action .

.

. in order to obtain a pecuniary or material benefit" for themselves, their
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German public officials laws specifically regulate public officials'
receipt of gifts. Many American ethics laws also limit or prohibit
acceptance of gifts,'53 though sometimes only if they exceed a specified
amount. 5 4 In contrast to the gift provisions in many American ethics
laws, the German gift provisions are quite straightforward:
The public official, including after the termination of the public
official relationship, may accept rewards or gifts, with respect to
his office, only with the approval of the highest authority or[, in
the case of a former public official, the highest authority at the
official's former place of employment or the authority's designated
representative]."'
Although
gifts, the
suspicion
American
proach.
4.

government regulations generally permit acceptance of small
approval requirement is interpreted broadly.'5 6 "Even the
of bias or corruption should be avoided."' Here again,
legislators would profit from a study of the German ap-

Outside Business Activities

German public officials laws devote substantial attention to the
regulation of those activities of an official, both on and off the job,

families, or businesses. § 4(1)(c). See also NML MODEL § 16 (requiring disclosure
and recusal by a state official or employee "who is required to take any action or
make any decision in the discharge of his official duties that may cause financial
benefit or detriment to him," his family, or business, where the benefit or detriment
"is distinguishable from the effects of such action on the public generally or a broad
segment of the public").
153 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-6 (1977); N.Y. ST. Co
'N DRAFt § 4(1)(b). See
also 5 U.S.C. § 7351 (1982); 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.202, 735.305 (1988).
'- See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 805-a(l)(a) (McKinney 1989 Supp.) ($75);
NML MODEL § 18 ($100 per year). See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 87313 (West 1987)
(disclosure required of identity of donors of gifts of $50 or more per month).
1"
BBG § 70. See also BRRG § 43; LBG(NRW) § 76. Acceptance of titles, medals,
or decorations from a foreign government also requires permission. BBG § 71;
LBG(NRW) § 77. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (1982).
16 See BATTIS, supra note 124, at 385-88; STRUNK, supra note 53, at 62; EBERT,
supra note 126, at 85; WEnsE, supra note 124, at 111. It should be noted that, at
least in this author's experience, receipt of outright gifts is less of a problem than
acceptance of financial benefits not available to the general public - for example,
participation in a lucrative investment or receipt of a loan on favorable terms. See
N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAt § 4(1)(b) (defining "gift or financial benefit" to include
"any financial transaction on terms not available to the general public").
"I BATTIS, supra note 124, at 385. See also STRUNK, supra note 53, at 62.

19881

U.S.-GERMAN

PUBLIC ETHICS LAW

that are not encompassed within the official's job description. 5 ' When
requested by a senior official, a German public official must undertake
an activity (Nebentatigkeit) that is subsidiary to the official's primary
duties, provided that the activity is within sphere of activities of the
public service, the public official possesses the requisite training or
education, and the activity does not make undue demands on him
or her, 15 9 a sui generis determination governed by the abilities of the
individual public official.16° Such undue demands are prohibited by
the government's duty to care for the public official (Fursorgepflicht),' 61 a further example of the Yin-Yang approach of German
public officials laws to the rights and duties of public officials.
Therefore, "[a] police public official may not be compelled to become
a translator [merely] because, by chance, he has passed a translator's
162
exam."
A subsidiary activity may be either a subsidiary occupation (Nebenbeschaftigung) or a subsidiary office (Nebenamt) 63 Under certain
"I' See BBG §§ 64-69a; BRRG § 42-42a; LBG(NRW) §§ 67-75a. Pursuant to BBG
§ 69, the subsidiary activities of federal public officials are further regulated in part
by the Federal Subsidiary Activities Regulation of Aug. 28, 1974, as amended
(Bundesnebentitigkeitsverordnung (BNV)), reprinted in BUNDESBEAMTENGESETZE (Beck
1986); pursuant to LBG(NRW) § 75, the subsidiary activities of public officials in
North Rhine-Westphalia are further regulated in part by the Subsidiary Activities
Regulation of Sept. 21, 1982, as amended (Nebentdtigkeitsverordnung (NtV(NRW))),
and the University Subsidiary Activities Regulation of Dec. 11, 1981, as amended
(Hochschulnebentdtigkeitsverordnung (HNtV(NRW))), both reprinted in H. REHBORN
(ed.), GESETZE DES LADEs NORDRHEiN-WEsTFALEN (1987). See generally SCmNEL-

supra note 124, at 100-117; ScHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 357-68; BATTIS,
supra note 124, at 358-85; EBERT, supra note 126, at 88-90; STRUNK, supra note
53, at 65-66; WIEsE, supra note 124, at 120-23; VON MNCH, supra note 124, at
38-40; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 87; APEL, supra note 57, at 51. Diagram No. 14
LENBACH,

in SCHEERBARTH sets forth an overview of the law governing subsidiary activities of

public officials.
119BBG § 64; LBG(NRW) § 67. See generally ScrEERBARTH, supra note 1, at
360-61. See also BNV § 3 and NtV(NRW) §§ 4 and 5 (restrictions on use of public
officials for subsidiary activities); BBG § 67, LBG(NRW) § 73, and BATTIS, supra
note 124, at 376-78 (right of public officials to indemnification for liability resulting
from the performance of subsidiary activities at the direction or request of superiors);
BBG § 68, LBG(NRW) § 74, NtV(NRW) § 21, and BATTIS, supra note 124, at 37879 (termination of subsidiary occupation or subsidiary office upon termination of
the public official relationship); BBG § 69, LBG(NRW) § 75, and BATTIs, supra
note 124, at 380-85 (promulgation of regulations on subsidiary activities).
160BATTIS, supra note 124, at 363.
See 29 BVERwGE 191, 194 (1968). See also BATTIS, supra note 124, at 363.
SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 360.
,63 See BBG § 64; LBG(NRW) § 67. See generally BATTIS, supra note 124, at 361161

162

63. The distinction between a subsidiary occupation and a subsidiary office has
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circumstances, a public official requested to perform a subsidiary
activity may be entitled to additional compensation from the public
employer.164
Although by definition a public official only undertakes a subsidiary
office within the context of the public service, he or she may engage
in a subsidiary occupation either within or without the public service. 165 Significantly, German public officials laws make no broad
distinction between subsidiary occupations performed within and without the public service. The propriety of a municipal public official
teaching a few hours a week in the municipality's vocational school
or teaching a vocational course in the evening in a private school
raises, at least initially, the same questions.
That approach contrasts sharply with most American public officials laws in general and with American ethics laws in particular,
which treat as entirely different questions the propriety of an official
performing activities for another public agency, for example, and the
permissibility of an official engaging in a private outside business.
The German approach again illustrates the extent to which German
public officials laws, in contrast to their American counterparts, seek
to integrate the ethical obligations of public officials into public
administrative law as a whole.
"With the exception of the subsidiary activities definitively specified
in [BBG] section 66(1), a public official requires prior approval to
undertake every subsidiary activity, to the extent he is not required
6 In particular,
to perform it pursuant to [BBG] section 64."'1
public
created confusion. See SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 358; SCHNELLENBACH, supra
note 124, at 100-103. See also BNV § 1 and NtV(NRW) § 2 (definitions of subsidiary
activity, subsidiary office, and subsidiary occupation); BNV § 2 and NtV(NRW) §
3 (definition of subsidiary activity in public service).
16, See BBG § 69(2) and BNV §§ 4, 6-8; LBG(NRW) § 75(6) and NtV(NRW) §§
11-15, 22. See generally ScHEER ARTH, supra note 1, at 365-66; BATTIS, supra note
124, at 381-85. "If a public official receives compensation for undertaking a subsidiary
activity that [in fact] belongs to his official duties (primary office ["Hauptamt"],
subsidiary office ["Nebenamt"j), he shall pay the compensation over to his employer." LBG(NRW) § 75a. Cf. BNV § 6(3); NtV(NRW) § 13(2); BATTIS, supra
note 124, at 383-84 (payment to employer of compensation for subsidiary activities
that exceeds yearly maximum). See generally voN MUNCH, supra note 124, at 3940.
161 See BNV § 1; NtV(NRW) § 2. See generally SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at

357-58.

16 BBG § 65. See also BRRG § 42(1). The public officials law of North RhineWestphalia sets forth specific subsidiary activities for which permission is required.
See LBG(NRW) § 68(1). See also NtV(NRW) § 8 (permission for subsidiary activities
in medical care). See generally SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 363-64; BATTIS, supra
note 124, at 364-69.
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officials must obtain permission to engage in any compensated occupation or employment-whether public or private-except as specifically provided by law. 67 The determination of which types of
subsidiary activities require permission, and which do not, appears
to depend upon the likelihood that the particular kind of activity
will result in a conflict with the duties of the public official, such
as the duty of complete dedication to one's profession and freedom
from partisanship and bias.' 61
BBG § 66(1) provides that permission is not required in certain
specified instances, although even there "a subsidiary activity that
does not require permission shall be prohibited, in whole or in part,
if by engaging in that activity the public official will violate his
official duties.' '1 69 "That a violation of duty is only probable is
insufficient [to justify prohibition of the activity]."' 70 Thus, for example, a conflict of interest exists when a tax official undertakes a
subsidiary activity in a society for income tax assistance.' 7 ' On the
other hand, the public authorities have been required to grant a
policeman permission to give driving lessons at a private driving
school on his own time. 172 The instances specified in section 66(1)
173
are exclusive, not merely illustrative.
Most important, under section 66(1), as a general rule, no permission is required when the public official receives no compensation
for the subsidiary activity. 74 Most American ethics laws similarly

See BBG § 65(1); BRRG § 42(1); LBG(NRW) § 68(1)(3).
See VON MUNCH, supra note 124, at 38-39.
169 BBG § 66(2); BRRG § 42(1) (emphasis added). See also LBG(NRW) § 69(2).
Subsidiary activities have also been prohibited on separation of powers grounds.
See, e.g., 41 BVERwGE 195 (1972) (judge as member of public saving bank's board
of administrators). See also VON MONCH, supra note 124, at 38.
170 SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 115. See also VON MONCH, supra note 124,
167

168

at 39.
171
172

39.

60 BVERwGE 254 (1980); VON MONCH, supra note 124, at 39.
VG Schleswig, reported in ZBR 148 (1972); VON MONCH, supra note 124, at

.73 See BBG § 65(1) ("with the exception of the subsidiary activities definitively
specified in section 66(1)"). See also SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 112.
174 BBG § 66(1)(1); BRRG § 42(1)(1). The Landesbeamtengesetz of North RhineWestphalia contains no general exemption for uncompensated activities. See
LBG(NRW) § 69. No permission is required to administer one's own assets; to
engage in literary, scientific, artistic, or lecture activities; for a professor to engage
as an expert in independent activities that are related to the professor's teaching or
research duties; or to be active in unions, professional organizations, or self-help
institutions for public officials. BBG § 66(1)(2)-(5); BRRG § 42(1)(2)-(5). Freedom
from obtaining permission in those four instances is constitutionally compelled by
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contain no restrictions upon uncompensated outside activities of public officials, unless a conflict of interest exists. However, under German public officials laws even certain gratis activities require
permission: undertaking a subsidiary office; becoming a guardian
(Vormundschaft) or trustee (Pflegschaft); acting as the executor of
a will; undertaking a commercial activity or engaging in a profession
(freien Beruf) (e.g., doctor or architect) or collaborating in either;
joining the executive body of an enterprise, except a cooperative
society (in which case permission is still required if compensation will
175
be received); and undertaking a trusteeship (Treuhanderschaft).
Although it has been said that the reason for requiring permission
in those instances is the likelihood that such activities will make
excessive demands on the public official, 176 it would seem that many
of those same activities also raise the specter of actual, potential, or
apparent conflicts of interest. American legislators should give further
consideration to whether certain outside activities of public officials,
even if uncompensated, should nonetheless be restricted or proscribed.
When permission for a subsidiary activity is required, that permission must be refused if "it appears [zu besorgen ist] that official
interests will be impaired by the subsidiary activity."'17 7 The standard
is one of probable impairment; a mere possibility is not sufficient,
but a high degree of probability within a reasonable time is not
necessary.'7 The public officials laws then lay out specific factors

GG art. 2(1) (right to free development of one's personality), GG art. 5(3) (freedom
of art, science, research, and teaching), and GG art. 9(3) (right to form associations).
See BATTIS, supra note 124, at 373; VON Minch, supra note 124, at 38-39. See also
LBG(NRW) § 69(1); NtV(NRW) § 9. See generally SCMNELLENBACH, supra note 124,
at 112-15; BATnS, supra note 124, at 372-76.
In addition, "general permission" has been granted for subsidiary occupations

that occur outside of working hours, are not otherwise prohibited, and which, together
with all other subsidiary occupations of the official, result in compensation not
exceeding 200 DM per month; however, the public official must still notify his
superior of the subsidiary activity. BNV § 5(1). See also NtV(NRW) § 7 (subsidiary
activities; 100 DM per month limit). "Compensation" (Vergfitung) is defined in
BNV § 4 and NtV(NRW) § 11.
175 See BBG § 66(l)(1); BRRG § 42(l)(1). See also LBG(NRW) § 68(1). See generally
EBERT, supra note 126, at 89-90.
See SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 112.
BBG § 65(2); BRRG 42(2). See also LBG(NRW) § 68(2) ("permission shall be
176

177

denied if the subsidiary activity can impair [beeintractigen kann] official interests");
NtV(NRW) § 6(2).
171

SCHNELLENBACH,

supra note 124, at 108. See also SCHERBARTH, supra note 1,

at 362-63; BATTIS, supra note 124, at 371 ("the mere fear of an impairment is
insufficient").
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that the superior is to consider in determining whether to deny the
public official's request. 7 9
First, the request may be denied if the nature and extent of the
subsidiary activity will employ the energies of the public official to
such an extent that it may hinder the orderly performance of his or
her official duties, which hindrance is, as a rule, found when the
official's subsidiary activities in a week exceed by one fifth the usual
weekly work time. Permission may also be denied when the subsidiary
activity could bring the public official into a conflict with his or her
official duties or when the activity will occur in a matter in which
the office to which the official belongs is or could become active.
A ground for denial of permission will exist if the activity could
influence the nonpartisanship or impartiality of the official or if the
activity could lead to a substantial limitation on the future availability
of the official. Finally, permission may be denied if the activity may
be injurious to the appearance (Ansehen) of public administration.1 0

179

BBG § 65(2)(l)-(6); BRRG § 42(2)(1)-(6). See also BNV § 5(2)-(3); LBG(NRW)

§ 68(2). See generally SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 108-11;

BATTIS,

supra

note 124, at 369-71.
- o BBG § 65(2)(l)-(6); BRRG § 42(2)(1)-(6). See also BNV § 5(2)-(3); LBG(NRW)
§ 68(2); BBG § 72a(2), LBG(NRW) § 68a, and LBG(NRW) § 78b(2) (the latter three
restricting compensated subsidiary activities by part-time public officials, public
officials with reduced work time, and public officials on leaves of absence). It should
be noted, however, that "only public interests related to official matters" will serve
as a basis for prohibiting, or denying permission for, a public official to engage in
a subsidiary activity. SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 106 (emphasis original).
The official, at least the federal official, has a right to the permission, unless a
ground for denying it exists. Id. at 107. See also BATTIS, supra note 124, at 369;
SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 361-63. A contrary rule might run afoul of the right
to free development of one's personality, guaranteed by article 2(1) of the German
Constitution. See BATTIS, supra note 124, at 359-60. Schnellenbach also questions
the constitutionality of refusing permission solely on the ground that the public
official may then compete with others in the labor market. SCHNELLENBACH, supra
note 124, at 106-107. But see LBG(NRW) § 68(3) (authorizing denial of permission
when the subsidiary activity may impair substantial interests of the labor market);
NtV(NRW) § 6a (definition of substantial impairment); SCHEERBARTH, supra note
1, at 363. Cf. SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 363 (noting that purpose of restrictions
on compensated subsidiary activities by part time public officials is to relieve the
labor market); BATTIS, supra note 124, at 371 (discussing circumstances under which
a third person has standing to oppose the granting of permission to a public official
for a subsidiary activity); voN MINCH, supranote 124, at 39 (same); SCHNELLENBACH,
supra note 124, at 116-17 (same). If permission once granted is subsequently revoked,
the official must be accorded time to wind up the subsidiary activity. BNV § 5(4);
NtV(NRW) § 6(4). Revocation of permission, in contrast to denial of permission,
presupposes not a prediction that the subsidiary activity will impair official interests
but an actual impairment of those interests. SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at
108.

360
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That final restriction must be viewed within the context of the
duty of public officials to conduct themselves, both on and off the
job, in a manner that will do justice to the respect and trust that
their profession requires.18 ' Thus a public official would be refused
permission to operate a bordello, to work as a doorman at a hotel
18 2
of bad repute, or to peddle goods on the street.
As local ethics boards in the United States are given increasing
authority to investigate and punish ethical improprieties by public
officials and to issue advisory opinions on the propriety of proposed
actions, those factors contained in the German public officials laws
should prove instructive and helpful. In particular, consideration
should be given to restricting an outside activity of a public official
when that activity, though presenting no present conflict of interest,
might likely preclude the official from acting on some matter in the
future, whether as a result of transfer to a different position or the
delegation of additional responsibilities. When a public official is in
fact a career public servant, then any outside activities which restrict
his or her future usefulness as a public official must viewed as suspect.
It must be emphasized, however, that that restriction, under German
law, only comes into play when the official might be transferred or
delegated the additional duties "with some probability within a rea83
sonable time. "1
In addition, before undertaking a compensated subsidiary activity
for which no permission is required or of a type for which general
permission has been given, a public official in some German states
must give prior written notification of the activity to his or her
superior unless the activity is a one-time occurrence. The notification
must set forth the nature and anticipated scope (number of hours
per week) of the activity.'l Such a procedure is thus akin to the
transactional disclosure requirements contained in many American
ethics laws. However, those American requirements are usually triggered when an official must take an official action that might produce
an actual or potential conflict with his or her existing private interests.
By contrast, the German notification procedure is directed at the

181

SCHNELLENBACH,

LBG(NRW) § 57.

supra note 124, at 110. See also BBG § 54; BRRG § 36;

182See SCHNELLENBACH,
183

supra note 124, at 110.

Id.

-- See NtV(NRW) § 10. Some members of the Commission to Study the Reform
of the Public Service Law proposed that notification, but no permission, be required
for all private subsidiary activities. See WESE, supra note 124, at 123.
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outside activity, rather than at official action, and occurs before the
outside activity produces any conflict of interest. Furthermore, the
American approach to transactional disclosure almost always requires
that the official recuse himself or herself from taking the official
action. The German notification procedure would ordinarily not require recusal-since the notification occurs before the conflict existsalthough the German official's superior could prohibit the subsidiary
activity if it would impair official interests.
Therefore, on the whole the German approach to outside business
activities of public officials encompasses a broader range of options
than does the approach of most American ethics laws. In contrast
to those laws, German regulations focus less on outright prohibition
of specified private business activities and more on disclosure and
permission. The German approach is thus far more flexible, allowing
public officials to obtain permission (and sometimes merely to give
notice) before engaging in compensated outside activities that might
technically violate an ethics law but that are in fact, under the
circumstances, entirely appropriate. Indeed, the German model is
more in accord with American ethics laws' general emphasis on
disclosure.
However, it should be noted that the German approach places far
greater reliance upon the administrative discretion of a superior than
does the American approach, which is largely self-regulating. Moreover, American government, at least at the local level, lacks a highly
institutionalized civil service and is dominated at the top by politicians.
Those differences between the two countries would restrict the wholesale adoption of the German model in the United States. Yet American
legislators should at least examine the German notification and permission procedure as an alternative to the current all-or-nothing
prohibitions on outside business activities. Perhaps, for example, that
German model could be modified to require that notification be made
to, and approval obtained from, the appropriate ethics board rather
than a superior.
As a general rule, under German law, subsidiary activities-whether
official or private-must be performed outside of working hours,
unless they are required or suggested by the public official's superior
or acknowledged by the superior as fulfilling an official interest. 185
In performing a subsidiary activity, a public official may use the

"I BBG § 65(3); BRRG § 42(3). See also LBG(NRW) § 70(1). See generally
SCHEERBARTH,

supra note 1, at 364.
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facilities, personnel, or material of the public employer only with its
permission, upon a showing of a public or scientific interest, and
8 6 For example, a doctor
upon reimbursement for the employer's costs.1
with the public health service might use public facilities to treat private
patients after hours. Significantly, therefore, German public officials
laws, to a much greater extent than American laws, specifically contemplate the use of public resources for nonpublic activities that
benefit the public or advance scientific knowledge. In this writer's
experience, it is not unusual for an allegation of unethical activity
lodged against an American public official to be based upon activities
of the official which, though nonpublic, in fact benefit the public.
For example, the supervisor of a village highway department might
use village materials and village employees to help him repair the
driveway of his daughter's parochial school or nursery school. If
such activities were not prohibited but merely strictly regulated, then
the public interest might be advanced while appearances of impropriety were reduced.
Some German public officials laws contain an annual financial
disclosure requirement with respect to subsidiary activities. Thus, at
the end of each fiscal year, public officials in North Rhine-Westphalia
must forward to their superiors a statement of the income from those
private subsidiary activities requiring permission, and from subsidiary
activities in public service, when the official's income from all such
18 7
subsidiary activities exceeds 1200 DM for that year.
That requirement provides some corroboration for the assertion
that the financial disclosure provisions in American ethics laws are
needed. However, unlike their American counterparts, the North,
Rhine-Westphalia requirements entirely dispense with disclosure of
income from a broad range of private subsidiary activities, namely
from those activities which the public official need not disclose to

"8 BBG § 65(5); BRRG § 42(4). See also BBG § 69(4) and Richtlinien fir die
Entrichtung des Nutzungsentgelts ffir Inanspruchnahme von Personal, Einrichtungen
und Material des Dienstherrn (Arbeitgebers) insbesondere aus Anlass einer Nebentdtigkeit (RHO § 41) of July 31, 1968 (Richtlinien); LBG(NRW) § 72 and NtV(NRW)
88 16-20. Under certain circumstances the public employer may dispense with reimbursement. See BBG § 69(4); Richtlinien Nr. 2(4); NtV(NRW) § 17(2). See generally

SCHNELLENBACH,

187 LBG(NRW)

supra note 124, at 111;

SCHEERBARTH,

supra note 1, at 367-68.

§ 71; NtV(NRW) § 15. For these purposes, activities for certain
publicly held entities are deemed to be activities in public service. NtV(NRW) §§
3(2), 15(1). See also BNV § 8 (requiring public officials to notify their superiors at
close of calendar year of gross income from subsidiary activities in public service
to the extent such income exceeds 1000 DM).
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his or her superiors. As noted above, in this writer's experience,
disclosure requirements are the provisions most objectionable to
American public officials. The North Rhine-Westphalia approach
would obviate some of those objections by exempting from disclosure
income from those outside activities that are unlikely to produce any
conflicts of interest or to impair an official's ability to perform his
or her job efficiently and impartially. Indeed, that approach could
be modified for purposes of American ethics laws to exempt from
disclosure income from those activities for which an official must
obtain permission but which the appropriate ethics board determines
do not warrant further disclosure.
Finally, German laws regulating subsidiary activities contain certain
revolving door restrictions. Retired public officials, or former public
officials who receive pension benefits from the public employer, must
notify their former agency of any occupation or employment they
undertake that relates to any of their official activities during the
last five years of their public service, if the occupation or employment
could impair official interests."" "If it appears that the occupation
or employment will impair official interests, it shall be prohibited."' 8 9
This provision is noteworthy in two regards. First, it establishes a
notification procedure for former public officials. That approach,
though rarely utilized in American ethics statutes, has much to commend it. Indeed, virtually all of the arguments in favor of transactional
disclosure by current public officials apply with equal force to notification by former public officials. The German notification procedure not only protects the public from former officials engaging
in activities in possible conflict with their former duties as public
servants, but also protects the former public officials themselves by
requiring them to obtain the imprimatur of their former employer
upon any activities that could conceivably result in charges of a
conflict of interest.
Second, unlike analogous provisions in some American ethics laws,
the German notification requirement, and any consequent prohibition
on employment, extends only until five years after the termination
of the official's public service, and relates only to activities performed
by the public official during the last five years of public service. 19°

"8 BBG § 69a(l); BRRG § 42a(1).

119BBG § 69a(2); BRRG § 42a(2).
,90
BBG § 69a(1), (3); BRRG § 42a(1), (3). In the case of public officials who
retire at age 65, the notification requirement extends for only three years after
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When this writer toured New York State discussing ethics laws with
municipal officials and concerned citizens, he discovered that public
officials were particularly concerned about any revolving door restriction that places any permanent bar upon their post-public employment activities.'91 That even German public officials laws, restrictive
as they otherwise are, contain no permanent bar on such activities
suggests that permanent bars in American ethics statutes for public
officials should be reconsidered; at the very least, the matter warrants
further study.
B. The Role of German Public Officials Among German Public
Servants
As noted above, this article addresses the public law context of
the ethical duties not of every German governmental employee but
only of German public officials (Beamten), who by law are accorded
a special place in the hierarchy of persons employed by federal, state,
and local governments. A word about that hierarchy is in order.
German public law has traditionally distinguished among three
groups of public servants: public officials (Beamten), public employees
(Angestellten), and public laborers (Arbeiter). 192 Article 33(4) of the
FRG Constitution would appear to provide that public employees
and public laborers, as a general rule, may not exercise governmental
authority as such and do not stand in any special relationship to the
state. Unlike public officials, they are regulated not by public law
but by collective bargaining agreements pursuant to private labor
law. 193 For public employees and public laborers, the state is little
different from a private employer. 194
Public officials, on the other hand, stand in a special relationship
to the state. Furthermore, appointment of someone as a public official
is only permissible when that person is to exercise either governmental
authority or responsibilities that for reasons of state or public security

termination of the public official's public service. BBG § 69a(l); BRRG § 42a(l).
The bar upon revealing or using confidential information is, however, permanent.
See BBG § 61(1); BRRG § 39(1); LBG(NRW) § 64(1).
191See, e.g., N.Y. ST. COMM'N DRAFT § 4(l)(k).
192 Of the 26 million employees in Germany, approximately 3.8 million are employed full-time, 500,000 part-time, in government service. WAGNER, supra note 57,

at 3.
"I See BBG § 191. See generally WAGNER, supra note 57, at 2.
'94 SCHEERBARTH,

supra note 1, at 66.
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may not be committed exclusively to persons whose relationship to
the state is governed by private law. 195
As a matter of practice and constitutional interpretation, however,
the line between the functions exercisable by public officials and those
exercisable by public employees has grown increasingly fuzzy. Public
employees now often exercise the same responsibilities as public officials. Indeed because the collective bargaining agreements of public
employees contain some duties that are the same as those of public
officials; those agreements also grant public employees substantial
job security. Thus, by contract, public employees have, in effect, a
relationship to the state that extends beyond the relationship of private
employee to private employer.' 96 The fact remains, however, that the
relationship between the public official and the state is a special one,
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Moreover, "despite some
advance toward the public officials law (for example, in collective
bargaining agreements of the public service), employees and laborers
in public service stand in a labor relationship governed by the labor
' 97
law, even when they exercise governmental authority."'
A public official'9" may be one of several types. 199 First, public
officials may be grouped according to the nature of their employer;

191
See BBG § 4; BRRG § 2(2).
19 See, generally, DEUTSCHER BEAMTENBUND (Association of German Public Officials], DBB ABC 100-101 (1978); WIESE, supra note 124, at 10-11; ZEILER, supra
note 63, at 14-15; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 66, 164-65.
'9

WIESE, supra note 124, at 11.

198
The word "Beamte," translated in this article as "public official," differs in
German law according to the context in which it is used: the constitutional context;
the liability context; and, at least formerly, the criminal law context. The constitutional context, which is addressed in the next section, is the narrowest and refers
to those individuals who have received a certificate of appointment and stand in a
relationship of service and loyalty to the state, governed by public law. This context
excludes, for example, public employees and public laborers; judges; the federal
President; the federal Chancellor and federal ministers, state minister presidents and
state ministers (Mitglieder der Bundes- und Landesregierung); church officials; soldiers; and independent notaries. The liability context is broader and encompasses
all persons, including public employees and public laborers, to whom in a particular
instance the exercise of a public office has been entrusted, as a consequence of
which the state, rather than the individual, bears primary responsibility for violations
of duty committed by that person against a third party while carrying out the official
responsibilities (GG art. 34; BGB § 839(1)). The criminal law context is the broadest
of the three and includes, for example, for purposes of corruption in office statutes,
the constitutional public officials, judges, and other persons whose activities fulfill
a function of public administration. See VoN MONCH, supra note 124, at 15-17;
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thus there are federal public officials, state public officials, municipal
public officials, and public officials of other public law entities (e.g.,
foundations). Second, a federal public official may be either a direct
(unmittelbarer) public official (that is, employed directly by the federal
government) or an indirect (mittelbarer) public official (that is, employed by a federal juridical entity, such as the Bundesbank). 2°°
Third, public officials are classified according to their career paths
(Laufbahngruppen), which in turn depend on the officials' training
and education-namely, public officials of higher, high, middle, and
simple service. Thus, for example, the educational minimums for
those four groups are, respectively, a university degree; completion
of a university preparatory high school (Gymnasium); completion of
a middle school (Realschule), or completion of basic school (Hauptschule) and vocational training; and completion of basic school
(Hauptschule). 201
Fourth, a public official is either a public official for life (that is,
until retirement) (Beamter auf Lebenszeit), a public official for a
term (Beamter auf Zeit), a probationary public official (Beamter auf
Probe), or a public official at will (Beamter auf Widerruf). 20 2 Appointment of public officials for a term is far less common in Germany
than in the United States, a fact that is attributable to the Germans'
emphasis upon a professional public officialdom. In the German
federal government, public officials for a term are rare. 20 3 In the
German states, such public officials include, primarily, elected local
government officials during their term of elected office. 2°4 An office
may be held by a public official for a term only when specifically
provided for by law. 20 5 Thus, restricting the number of public officials
ZEILER, supra note 63, at 24-27; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 133-135; WAGNER,
supra note 57, at 20-21; EBERT, supra note 126, at 54-55.
199See generally EBERT, supra note 126, at 57-61; APEL, supra note 57, at 12-14;

WAGNER, supra note 57, at 27-31; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 27-32; VON MONCH,

supra note 124, at 17-21; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 135-159.
See BBG § 2. Compare LBG(NRW) § 2 (making no such distinction for public
officials of North Rhine-Westphalia). See generally WAGNER, supra note 57, at 27;
ZEILER, supra note 63, at 27; BocHALu, supra note 124, at 8.
201 BBG §§ 15-19; BRRG § 13; LBG(NRW) §§ 15-20.
See BBG §§ 5, 6(2); BRRG §§ 3(1), 5(2), 95-98; LBG(NRW) §§ 5, 8(2), 30.

See WAGNER, supra note 57, at 29. An example would be a managing member
of the college of the armed forces.
204Id.; APEL, supra note 57, at 14; VON MPNCH, supra note 124, at 18; ZEILER,

supra note 63, at 29-30. University presidents are also public officials for a term.
See WAGNER, supra note 57, at 29.
201 BRRG § 95(1). See also APEL, supra note 57, at 14; ZEILER, supra note 63,

at 29.
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for a term substantially reduces the need for complex ethics laws
aimed at preventing the evils inherent in the American revolving door
approach to public service.
With respect to public officials at will, it must be emphasized that
such officials are very much the exception in Germany, not the rule.
They are not to be equated with those American public employees
who serve at the pleasure of an elected official. Rather, in Germany
public officials at will include only public officials who have not
completed the required preparatory service or who are exercising only
incidentally or temporarily the kind of responsibility (in particular,
governmental authority) that as a rule must be exercised by a public
official. 2 06 Indeed, as stated by the federal law setting minimum
standards for state public officials laws, "The rule is public official
relationship for life."

20 7

Finally, certain special categories of public officials exist, including
honorary public officials (Ehrenbeamten), elected public officials
(Wahlbeamten), and political public officials (politische Beamten). 208
Honorary public officials, such as honorary mayors 2°9 or aldermen
(Stadtrat), play a significant role in municipal administration but have
some other primary occupation. An honorary public official is not
entitled to compensation or to many of the benefits of the usual
public official and is regulated according to the particular law governing his or her type of office. 2 0 Elected public officials include

those individuals elected to govern a municipality or municipal organization 211
Political public officials hold an office in which they must be in
continuous agreement with the essential political views and goals of
the government. They may be relieved of their office at any time,
21 2
but not arbitrarily.

206

See BBG § 5(2); BRRG § 3(l)(4); LBG(NRW) § 5(l)(4).

- BRRG § 3(1).
208 One might also note the relatively recent development of part-time career public
officials. See BBG §§ 72a, 79a. See also WAGNER, supra note 57, at 28.
209 State municipality laws determine whether a mayor is an honarary public offical
or an elected public official. Where the mayor is an honorary public official, the
city director, an elected public official, heads the public administration.
210 See BBG § 177; BRRG § 115; LBG(NRW) § 183. See also WAGNER, supra
note 57, at 28; ZELER, supra note 63, at 29; VON MUNCH, supra note 124, at 2021; EBERT, supra note 126, at 58; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 139.
211 See BRRG § 95(1); LBG(NRW) §§ 5(3),
10(2), 15(2), 31(2); SCHEERBARTH,
supra note 1, at 145-47; EBERT, supra note 126, at 58.
212 BRRG § 31. See also BBG § 36; LBG(NRW) § 38; ZEILER, supra note 63, at
28-29; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 144-45; EBERT, supra note 126, at 58-59;
WAGNER, supra note 57, at 28.
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The nature and limited role of political public officials are particularly instructive for students of American public administration. By
mandating, as a general rule, that public officials be appointed for
life, Article 33 of the West German Constitution restricts the appointment of political public officials to the highest levels of government, basically the first one or two levels below the cabinet itself,
such as deputy and assistant secretaries and close advisors of the
federal Chancellor or of the heads of individual states. 21 3 Indeed, the
law sets forth an exclusive list of those offices which may be filled
by political public officials. 21 4 Even so, there have been periodic calls
for the abolition of this category of public officials. 215 Furthermore,
the vast majority of political public officials are career public officials
and must comply with the relevant educational, training, and ex21 6
amination requirements.
In sharp contrast to this scheme, the view has often been expressed
in the United States that, in the words of the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee:
the so-called "revolving door" between private life and government
service is a distinctly American institution that is one of the real
strengths of our government. By attracting top people from the
private sector to serve the nation every four or eight years, we infuse
new blood and new ideas into the bureaucracy ....
We are also
able to infuse new blood into all levels of the bureaucracy, so that
even the career civil service is not made up exclusively of permanent
office holders. This strengthens our system of government by making
27
it more vital and by tying it more closely to the people it serves.
With all due respect, in the face of repeated revelations of ethical
improprieties by political appointees at all levels of government, that
213See BBG § 36; BRRG § 31; LBG(NRW) § 38(1); DBB ABC, supra note 196,
at 53. The German Association of Public Officials has questioned the constitutionality
of LBG(NRW) § 38, to the extent that it classifies as political public officials heads
of provincial governments (Regierungspradsidenten), directors of prosecutions (Generalstaatsanwilte), chief commissioners of police (Polizeiprasidenten), and directors
of police (Polizeidirektoren). See DBB ABC, supra note 196, at 53.
21 See BBG § 36(1); LBG(NRW) § 38(1). See also SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1,
at 144.
211 WAGNER, supra note 57, at 28. Some German states, for example Bavaria,
have no political public officials. ZEILER, supra note 63, at 29.
216 See BBG § 36; BRRG § 31; LBG(NRW) § 38. See also DBB ABC,
supra note
196, at 53.
217 Additional Views of Peter W. Rodino, Jr., accompanying H.R. REP. No. 1068,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 45. See also Supplemental Views of Mr. Sensenbrenner,
id., at 51 ("I am loath to turning the government over to full-time bureaucrats").
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view is at best simplistic and at worst utter nonsense. At the very
least, one must question whether the price of this new blood has
become unacceptably high.
Revolving doors create serious ethical problems that give rise to
ill-considered legislation, such as the now defunct Post-Employment
Restrictions Act of 1988 (H.R. 5043), discussed at the outset of this
article. 218 Revolving doors demoralize career public officials, who see
the politically connected promoted over the dedicated and highly
experienced professional, and institutionalize inefficiency by requiring
new middle- and low-level political appointees to reinvent the wheel
every four or eight years.
Moreover, this revolving door policy is completely unnecessary. If
the bureaucracy is moribund, then the answer lies in radically restructuring that bureaucracy, a task for which a political appointee,
here today and gone tomorrow, has neither the knowledge nor the
time to undertake. Even the best new blood is of little help if it is
leeched out of the vein of the body politic in the next election. Rather,
public service must become sufficiently attractive to induce top people
to make a long-term career change from the private into the public
sector.
No one would seriously dispute the right of an elected chief executive, whether President of the United States or mayor of a city,
to appoint top level advisors whose political philosophy is compatible
with the executive's own. However, by analogy to the German model,
consideration should be given to requiring that all local government
political appointees, and all federal and state political appointees
below the cabinet level, be drawn from the ranks of career public
officials. Such an approach, when combined with a revitalized public
service, would increase morale among public servants, promote efficiency in government, minimize ethical problems resulting from the
revolving door syndrome, and obviate the need to pay off campaign
supporters with political appointments. Thus, for example, ambassadorships would no longer be for sale to substantial campaign contributors, who now all too often lack diplomatic experience or
proficiency in the relevant foreign language.
In short, under the German system, the vast majority of public
officials are public officials for life. With few exceptions, positions
that in the United States are held by individuals appointed for a term

218 See,

e.g., H.R. REp. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15-16.
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or who serve at the pleasure of an elected executive or legislative
body, whether or not as a result of their political affiliation, are in
Germany held by public officials for life. Furthermore, in Germany
few positions other than those of chief executive and legislator are
filled by election. Thus, for example, under the German system,
federal and state assistant attorneys general, city clerks, town highway
superintendents, and building inspectors would all be public officials
for life.
Whether American governments, particularly municipal governments, should adopt such a system of career public officials raises
significant, and complex, philosophical and economic questions, questions that have far too rarely been addressed. In particular, one must
examine the tradeoffs between that system and the present American
system, which is often dominated by volunteer boards, political appointees, elected officers even in administrative posts, and relatively
short-term officials in important administrative positions.
On the one hand, it is becoming increasingly difficult in the American system to fill positions on volunteer boards that are vital to the
functioning of the local government (e.g., legislative bodies, planning
boards, zoning boards). The American system of local government
also tends to be inefficient and overly sensitive to political and
community pressure. 2 9 Small communities, which in many states are
almost wholly dependent on volunteers and part-time employees, are
finding it difficult to provide increasingly complex services and to
comply with increasingly complex laws. Failures in services and inadvertent violations of the law are not infrequent results. 220 Finally,
as noted above, the revolving door approach to American government
tends to foster ethical problems.
On the other hand, imposing a German-type career public official
system on American local governments would prove enormously expensive, at least in the short run, and would, to some extent, remove
those governments from the control of the people. Dispersal of power
(home rule) and citizen participation are among the hallmarks of

219 The devastating results that can occur when a municipality caves in to community
pressure have recently been vividly illustrated by the Yonkers desegregation fight.
See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, -U.S. __ , 108 S. Ct. 2821, 100 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1988).
220 For example, in the course of representing various municipalities, this author
found, among other municipalities, widespread failure to obey New York's complex
regulations governing environmental review. In the majority of cases, that failure
appeared inadvertent.
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American government, at least at the local level. Yet one must question
whether in the long run a career system is not cheaper, whether citizen
participation has in any event become difficult to sustain, and whether
direct community control is as necessary, or desirable, when public
officials are less subject to pressure from individuals, political parties,
special interests, and monetary concerns.
C. Constitutional and Public Law Bases for the German
Professional Public Officialdom
Whatever position American federal, state, and local governments
take on the issue of career public officials, the current approach of
those governments to the ethical duties of public officials is wholly
untenable. In particular, legislators cannot continue to impose increasingly stringent ethical duties without enacting corresponding rights.
The Germans have long understood this relationship of duties and
rights. Indeed, German public officials laws describe the position of
the public official vis d vis the public employer as the "public official
relationship" (Beamtenverhaltnis). "Duties and rights of public officials are interrelated; they correlate to each other. As a rule, a duty
of the public official corresponds to a right of the public employer,
a duty of the public employer to a right of the public official. Thus
is the principle of mutuality, the principle that determines the shaping
of the duties and rights of the public official relationship as a relationship of service and loyalty governed by public law." ' 22' Ac-

cordingly, the ethical obligations of public officials cannot be regulated,
or even understood, independently from those officials' rights, an
immutable fact that American legislators, at least at the state and
local level, have thus far almost entirely failed to appreciate.
German public officials, in sharp contrast to public employees and
public laborers, stand in a special relationship to the state, a relationship that is enshrined in Article 33 of the German Constitution:
(1) Every German in every state has the same rights and duties as
a [German] citizen.
(2) Every German, according to his aptitude, qualifications, and
professional achievement, is equally eligible for every public office.
(3) The enjoyment of civil and citizenship rights, the admission to
public office, and the rights acquired in public service are independent of religious persuasion. No one may suffer a disadvantage

221

WIEsE, supra note 124, at 164.
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because of his adherence or lack of adherence to a religious persuasion or ideology.
(4) As a rule, only members of the public service who stand in a
relationship of service and loyalty governed by public law shall be
assigned, as an ongoing responsibility, the exercise of governmental
authority ["hoheitsrechtlicher Befugnisse"].
(5) Public service law shall be regulated with due regard to the
traditional principles of the professional public officialdom ["Berufsbeamtentum"].222

(The consideration of other groups that stand in a special relationship
to the state, such as judges, soldiers, cabinet ministers, parliamentary
state secretaries, and college professors, is beyond the scope of this

article .223)
Article 33 establishes the fundamental public administrative law
context for the ethical obligations of German public officials. From
that article, certain characteristics of public officials may be extracted.
First, as a general rule such officials are the only members of public
service who may exercise governmental authority, at least as an
ongoing responsibility, although, as noted above, that rule varies in
practice. Second, the German tradition of a professional public officialdom shall continue. Third, public officials stand in a special
relationship of service and loyalty to the state and are governed not
by the usual principles of private labor law but by public law. Fourth,
public officials shall be selected (and advanced) according to merit
(the so-called "Leistungsprinzip"); and, concomitantly, their religious
and ideological persuasion shall play no part in their selection or

- Other provisions of the Constitution relevant to public officials are: GG art.
34 (establishing that the state is primarily responsible for violations of duty committed
by an official against a third party while carrying out official responsibilities), GG
art. 36 (requiring that, at the highest levels of the federal government, public officials
be drawn proportionately from all states), GG art. 60(1) (providing that the federal
President shall appoint and dismiss federal judges, federal public officials, officers,
and noncommissioned officers, except as otherwise provided by law), GG art. 131
(providing that federal law shall regulate those who were members of the public
service on May 8, 1945), GG art. 132 (authorizing the retirement or transfer of
unqualified public officials and judges who, at the time the Constitution became
effective, possessed appointments for life), and, in particular, GG art. 137(1) (providing that the right of public officials, public employees, professional soldiers,
volunteer soldiers for a term, and judges to stand for election to federal, state, or
local office may be restricted by law).
223 See generally SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 66.
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advancement. Article 33 applies to all public officials in Germany,
224
federal, state, and local .
1. Exercise of Governmental Authority
A good deal of scholars' blood has been spilled over the difficult
concept of "hoheitsrechtliche Befugnisse" -here translated as "governmental authority" -which, by constitutional mandate, may regularly be exercised only by public officials (Beamten), not by any
other type of public servants. Certainly, the meaning of the phrase
"governmental authority" is unclear. Commentators speak in terms
of acting in a governmental capacity, of performing state activities
in accordance with public law, of exercising state authority in an
intrusive manner (Eingriffsverwaltung) through command and compulsion, or of undertaking activities of surpassing interest to the
public. 225 Such formulations provide little assistance and merely beg
the question of what governmental authority means.
However, the purpose of the "governmental authority" requirement
is generally considered to be two-fold. First, it insures that matters
within the scope of that authority are handled only by individuals
who are not only qualified but who also stand in a particularly close
relationship of dependency with the state (for example, public officials
have no right to strike). Second, the requirement helps to prevent
the dissipation of the traditional principles of the professional officialdom and to preserve a substantial area of meaningful activity for
public officials.

226

Analogous concepts exist, of course, in American government, but
in a curiously perverted form. In the United States, especially in state
and local government, many higher level governmental officials who
clearly exercise "hoheitsrechtliche Befugnisse," and who would therefore be public officials (Beamten) under German law, are exempt
from many of the protections, and requirements, of civil service.
Many of those higher level officials are either employees at will (for
example, deputy department heads or town clerks) or elected public
officials (for example, in New York State, many town highway superintendents, the primary target of the FBI sting operation mentioned
22

See

221

See, e.g., T.

APEL,

supra note 57, at 3; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 69.
MAUNZ,

G. DRIG 2 GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 21-22 (1987)

("MAUNZ-DORIG KOMMENTAR") (commentary on FRG Constitution); ZEILER, supra
note 63, at 15-16; VON MONCH, supra note 124, 21-22; EBERT, supra note 126, at

55-56; WEisE, supra note 124, at 10; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 76.
226

See

2 MAUNZ-DORIG KOMMENTAR,

supra note 225,

at 21.
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in the introduction to this article). Accordingly, many members of
the very class of public servants to which the West German Constitution accords special protections, and concomitantly from which it
exacts special commitments, are, in the United States, left to swing
in the winds of superiors' whims or voter caprice. It should thus
come as no surprise when American public officials balk at the
imposition of additional ethical restrictions. Platitudes such as "a
public office is a public trust" carry little weight for the public
official who may be dismissed at will.
The answer to this problem, it is suggested, lies not in the blind
extension of the civil service system to cover public officials but rather
in the acknowledgment of two basic facts. First, public officials fulfill
a special function in the exercise of governmental authority. Second,
the public is best served and protected when that special function is
recognized and when its exercise is limited to licensed, qualified
professionals to whom certain privileges are accorded and from whom,
therefore, certain concessions may be exacted.
The entire structure of the German officialdom mirrors that principle: because so many substantial duties are imposed upon public
officials, they must be accorded certain substantial rights. As stated
by the Association of German Public Officials (Deutscher Beamtenbund), "[tihis function [of governmental activity-to realize the common good-] requires that as a rule only those persons shall carry
out the duties of government administration who, to a high degree,
may be viewed as trustees of governmental authority and of the entire
people. ' 227 Until American governments accord public officials trust,
protection, and exclusive authority commensurate with their position,
those governments cannot justifiably expect public officials to act as
trustees of the public good. At least in this instance, without trust,
there will be no trustee.
2.

Continuation of Professional Public Officialdom

Paragraph 5 of Article 33, together with paragraph 4, constitutes
the so-called "institutional guarantee of a professional public officialdom. ' 221 "The Constitution is concerned with securing the professional public officialdom as an institution," in wa%;cordance with
principles laid down before the war, during the Weimar Republic. 229

227 DBB

ABC, supra note 196, at 9.

supra note 57, at 12;

228

See, e.g.,

WAGNER,

229

WAGNER,

supra note 57, at 12-13.
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Analogous provisions, regulating civil service, are not uncommon in
state constitutions in the United States.23 0
It was not the intent of this institutional guarantee to enshrine
particular principles in a particular form but rather to ensure that
the essence of professional officialdom would be preserved. Despite
its precatory language-"with due regard to" the traditional principles-Article 33(5) is regarded as mandating respect for those tra21
ditional principles.
This institutional guarantee of a professional public officialdom
addresses a problem the very existence of which has gone virtually
unrecognized in the United States. American governments for the
most part simply do not stand behind their non-civil service public
officials as an institution. Indeed, there is no such institution. Many
public officials, like this author during his year-long stint with the
New York State government, appear to drift in and out of public
service with little sense of cohesiveness as a group and with little
continuity.
3.

Special Relationship of Service and Loyalty

Included among the traditional principles of a professional public
officialdom referred to in Article 33(5) is the "relationship of service
and loyalty governed by public law" set forth in Article 33(4); indeed,
there has been a tendency to draw additional principles from that
quoted phrase itself. 232 Out of that relationship arise certain duties,
public servants, only public
especially loyalty and obedience. Among
233
relationship.
that
officials stand in
The relationship of service is characterized by complete dedication
and a constant readiness to serve. The Federal Constitutional Court
has ruled that that duty to serve precludes strikes by public officials
and requires administration of office without regard to partisan politics. 23 4 Significantly, that duty of service "is legally and financially
secured by an appointment for life.' '235 Again, for the German public
official, rights and duties, including ethical obligations, remain two
sides of the same coin.
e.g., N.Y. CONST., art. V, § 6.
See, e.g., MAUNZ-DORIG KOMMENTAR, supra note 225, at 32; WAGNER, supra
note 57, at 13; ZEILER, supra note 63, at 18.
232 See, e.g., WAGNER, supra note 57, at 13; WEEsE, supra note 124, at 9-11.
230 See,
231

233 WIESE, supra note 124, at
234 See 44 BVERFGE 249, 264

11.

(1977); 9 BVERFGE 268, 286 (1959). See also WIESE,

supra note 124, at 12.
233 WrESE, supra note 124, at 12.
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The relationship of loyalty mandates that a public official maintain
confidentiality and always intercede for the state, the constitutional
order, the interests of the whole, and the interests of the official's
employer. 236 That same relationship, however, requires the government
23 7
to provide for the welfare of the public official.
Although in this author's experience many American public officials, particularly at the local level, are enormously dedicated public
servants striving to provide service and maintain loyalty under often
difficult conditions, that service and loyalty is seldom mandated by
law and is rarely, if ever, viewed as reciprocal to the government's
duty of service and loyalty to the public official. Whatever rights
the law may grant to public officials, whatever duties it may exact,
the law neither mandates nor recognizes a special relationship of
mutual service and loyalty between American governments and their
public officials.
4. Merit Selection
Finally, Article 33 mandates that public officials be selected and
advanced solely according to merit. That requirement not only secures
individual rights but protects the institution of professional officialdom. 238 In particular, sex, parentage, race, language, homeland, origin, faith, and religious or political views may not be considered in
appointing or promoting public officials. 239 The tension between this
guarantee, to the extent it protects freedom of expression and political
beliefs, and the duty of loyalty has engendered substantial debate in
Germany, particularly over the question of "radicals in public
service."240
If a sort of professional public officialdom were to be adopted in
the United States, this principle of merit selection for public officials
might clash with three of the holiest sacred cows of American public
service: affirmative action, political patronage, and, ironically, the
civil service system itself. Merit selection in the United States is
generally viewed either as an end in itself, as a means of promoting
rather vague notions of equality, or as a way of preventing political
patronage or other irrelevant factors from interfering unduly with

116

Id. at 12-14.
at 14.
supra note 124, at 16.

237 Id.
23 Id.
239

240

See GG art. 3(3), 33(2)-(3). See also WiEsE, supra note 124, at 16.
See, e.g., SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 70-76.
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the appointment of the best qualified candidate. The guarantee of
merit selection of public officials in Germany is far more significant,
for without merit selection the entire structure of a professional public
officialdom, based upon the mutual loyalty of the public official and
the state, would collapse.
To the extent it is not legally compelled-in order to remedy past
discrimination-any affirmative action program that countenanced
the promotion of any female or minority candidate who was less
qualified than a male or non-minority candidate would seem seriously
to undermine this principle of merit selection and thus to undermine
the entire structure of a professional officialdom. Yet discrimination
on the grounds of race, sex, religion, political beliefs, 2"1 or national
or family origin-including any discrimination reflected in qualifying
examinations-would be absolutely antithetical to the concept of a
professional public officialdom and would be intolerable, not only
because such discrimination is offensive, unfair, and unjust, but also
because it would threaten the entire system of a professional officialdom.
Accordingly, the scope and methods of implementing affirmative
action programs would have to be reevaluated to determine whether
their potentially deleterious impact upon the principle of merit selection, and therefore upon the underpinnings of a comprehensive
structure of professional officialdom, outweighed the benefits of those
programs in aiding minorities and establishing equal representation
of races and sexes in public service. In particular, since the principle
of merit selection for a professional officialdom would preclude any
consideration of such factors in the advancement of public officials,
affirmative action programs would have to focus upon post-appointment education and training to an extent heretofore virtually unknown
among government agencies. However, such education and training
can only be given after the individual has joined the public service,
presumably in a provisional capacity. To ignore race and sex in the
appointment of public official positions would sound the death knell
for affirmative action in public service since the public service cannot
be responsible for pre-appointment education and training; factors
24, As noted above, however, a public official "must,
by his entire conduct,
acknowledge the free and democratic basic order, in the constitutional sense, and
intercede to preserve it." BBG § 52(2); BRRG § 35(1); LBG(NRW) § 55(2). See
also Weimar RBG art. l0a; ZEnER, supra note 63, at 95-96. This duty is also one
of the traditional principles of professional officialdom and arises out of the duty
of loyalty. See WmsE, supra note 124, at 12.
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such as race and sex would therefore continue to be considered in
the initial (provisional) appointment.
Likewise, one must question whether civil service in its present
form could, or should, survive if a system of professional public
officialdom were adopted. Certainly, civil service employees should
not enjoy more rights, while being subject to fewer duties, than public
officials themselves, for the very basis of a professional public officialdom lies in the special relationship in which such public servants,
and no others, stand with the state. Perhaps, for example, many of
the rights, privileges, and duties that are now governed by civil service
laws should increasingly be left to individual contract negotiations.
Consideration of such matters-or of the substantial rights enjoyed
by German public employees and laborers-is, however, beyond the
scope of this article.
Patronage is generally regarded in Germany as antithetical to professional public officialdom. Indeed, the Association of German Public Officials calls patronage (Amterpatronage) "a cancer in
government." 242 Although particularly understandable in view of the
Nazi party's control of public officials during the Hitler regime, that
belief in fact antedates Hitler. Indeed, it would seem to be traceable
to the fact that in Germany, in contrast to the United States, public
service as a profession first arose not in the context of a government
controlled by an elected party but rather in a monarchy. The king,
not parties, appointed public officials. Thus, it is hardly surprising
that political patronage would later be frowned upon as contrary to
professional officialdom. 243 Although, as noted above, public officials
were expected to be loyal to the ruling political party, it has not
been suggested that the duty of political loyalty extended to performing favors for the party in violation of one's obligations as a
public official.
One might thus be tempted to distinguish between patronage (appointing or advancing an official because of his or her political beliefs
and activities), a requirement that public officials be loyal (or at least
not disloyal) to the ruling political party, and actual personal or
political payoffs by the official to the party. However, the distinction
ultimately collapses, as the role of party politics in twentieth century
German public officialdom dramatically demonstrates.
242

DBB ABC, supra note 196, at 37.

One might, however, consider the extent to which nobles might have been
favored over commoners and members of the upper classes over members of the
lower classes. See THILE, supra note 46, at 18.
243
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The national assembly that formulated the 1919 Reichs Constitution
regarded party influence on the appointment of public officials as
"unavoidable and necessary" in the Weimar Republic,2 Germany's
first real experiment with democracy. Article 130(1) of the 1919 Reichs
Constitution, which stated that "public officials are servants of the
whole, not of a party," was intended to remind parties and public
officials that the officials were not party functionaries and that their
245
appointment did not give their supporters claim on the officials.
Not infrequently, the admonition fell on deaf ears.
Unlike the situation in Bismarck's Germany, where public officials,
like the state, were politically one-sided, in the Republic both public
officialdom and the state were splintered by political parties.24 As
the stakes for political influence rose, so did the pressures for personal
and political payoffs by public officials to party officials. In 1921
the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht)
already felt compelled to uphold the dismissal of a public official
who had imparted confidential information to party officials on
247
various matters, thus violating his duty of confidentiality.
As a powerless minority party, the Nazis railed unrelentingly against
"partybook public officials" (Parteibuchbeamten). Yet as the NSDAP
gained power, "[t]he struggle against the 'partybook public officialdom' was forgotten when it came time to provide for the party's
own followers.

'248

When the Nazis finally seized control, they dis-

missed not merely partybook public officials but all public officials
who were actual and potential opponents of the regime-and replaced
them with valued national socialists. 249 Thus in Prussia 28% of the
senior public officials were dismissed; in the other states, almost
10%.250 As noted above, party loyalty and public duty became syn-

onymous .251
"One should finally perceive that patronage leads in a very risky
way to the equating of parties and state. ... The more that offices

1,4
245

HATTENHAUER,

Id.

"6See

supra note 50, at 325.

THIELE, supra note 46, at 49.
76 OVGE 476 (Prussia 1921). See also HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 325.
248 HATTENHAUER, supra note 50, at 373.
249 See MOMMSEN, supra note 79, at 45; HATTENHAIJER, supra note 50, at 375382.
150 HATTENHAtrER, supra note 50, at 381.
"I1See generally id. at 382-413; MOMMSEN, supra note 79, at 66-90; THIELE, supra
note 46, at 65-67.
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in public service (in particular in the critical positions) are filled in
accordance with purely partisan viewpoints, the less that public service
is in the position to fulfill its public responsibilities in a fair and
nonpartisan manner.

'25 2

For these reasons, consideration must be

given to the complete abolition of patronage appointments in American government, except at the highest, cabinet level positions.
5.

Traditional Principles of Professional Public Officialdom

German courts and commentators have identified certain principles
of professional public officialdom as being mandated by Article 33
of the West German Constitution.2 13 Many of the most important of
those principles are derived directly from the 1919 Reichs Constitution,
including the right to become a public official for life; the right to
pensions and survivors benefits, regulated by law; rights of appeal
and the protection of the law; the right to retirement; the prohibition
against temporary loss of position except in accordance with legally
established conditions and formalities; the right to a hearing before
adverse facts are entered in one's personnel file; the right to review
one's personnel file; and the requirement that public officials serve
25 4
the public as a whole, not a party or person.

Among the other principles of professional officialdom are the
relationship of service and loyalty regulated by public law; the principle of superiors and subordinates; the principle of education, training, and examination; the career principle (Laufbahnprinzip); the
principle of maintenance and support of the public official (Alimentationsprinzip); the principle of documentation; and the principle of
merit selection and advancement (Leistungsprinzip). 255 Lists might vary
somewhat from one commentator to another-for example, some
might separately cite the prohibition on strikes or the regulation of
rights and duties by law rather than by contract or the duty to
maintain confidences or the right to form associations-but the basic
25 6
principles remain the same.

Furthermore, it is apparent that traditional principles of professional public officialdom, as enshrined by the West German Con252DBB
253See,

ABC, supra note 196, at 37.
e.g., ZEILER, supra note 63, at 20; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 13-14;
WIESE, supra note 124, at 9-22; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 77-84; APEL, supra
note 57, at 3.
254

See id. and 1919 REICHSVERE. art. 128-131.

255See, e.g., APEL, supra note 57, at 3
256See, e.g., ZELLER, supra note 63, at 20; WAGNER, supra note 57,
WIESE, supra note 124, at 9-22; SCm ERBARTH, supra note 1, at 77-84.

at 13-14;
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stitution, include at least as many rights of public officials as duties . 2 7
Yet on its face Article 33 is intended, first and foremost, to protect
professional public officialdom, not individual public officials. 2 8 One
can, therefore, only conclude that the authors of the West German
Constitution, and the courts that have interpreted it, have determined
that the preservation of professional public officialdom lies in the
protection of the independence of public officials themselves. As
stated by the Association of German Public Officials, "A strong and
independent professional public officialdom guarantees that the public
administration [6ffentliche Verwaltung] will act solely in accordance
with the law and that that public administration can thereby preserve
the legality and neutrality to which it has been enjoined. "259
American legislators have largely failed to appreciate that relationship between the independence of public officials and their ethical
standards. Yet it would seem axiomatic that political appointees, or
indeed any officials serving at will, would tend to accede to the desires
of those at whose will they serve. The experience of German public
officials during the Third Reich illustrates that fact with shocking
clarity; as the Nazi party increasingly encroached upon the independence of those officials and made them increasingly beholden to
the party for their livelihood, the party's wish became the official's
command.
Moreover, American public officials who are encouraged to view
themselves as only temporary holders of public office can hardly be
faulted for keeping one eye open for employment opportunities with
the private companies that appear before them-and perhaps for
occasionally providing those companies with special attention. Without political and financial independence-including, in many instances, and particularly at the municipal level, substantially increased
salaries and benefits-public officials simply cannot be expected to
conduct themselves with "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" while constantly confronting the "morals of the market
place. '9

26

0

After all, as one municipal official told this writer, public

officials "are not a cadre of priests."

257

See ZELER, supra note 63, at 20.

See 9 BVERFGE 261, 286 (1959) ("the intent of the Constitution [GG] is not
to protect subjective rights of the public official in the first instance but rather to
preserve the institution of the professional public officialdom in the interest of the
general public").
219 DBB ABC, supra note 196, at 9.
2-0 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
258
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In failing to establish and maintain the independence of public
officials, American public officials laws virtually guarantee that an
unacceptable number of officials will succumb to political and financial pressures and take actions that at least in spirit violate the
ethics laws. The answer to this problem lies, however, not in more
ethics laws but in fewer pressures-that is, in greater independence
for American public officials.
D. Rights of German Public Officials
The independence of German public officials rests in the protection
of their rights. Those rights are specifically laid down in numerous
laws and regulations. 261 Among the most important are: the Federal
Public Officials Law (Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG)), which regulates
only officials of the Federal Republic of Germany itself; the Public
Officials Framework Law (Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz (BRRG)), which
provides the minimum standards for non-federal public officials with
which all state public officials laws must comply; the Federal Disciplinary Procedure (Bundesdiziplinarordnung), which sets forth the
procedure regulating disciplinary proceedings against federal public
officials; the Federal Compensation Law (Bundesbesoldungsgesetz),
which regulates compensation for all public officials, judges, professional soldiers, and teachers in public schools and universities; and
the individual state public officials laws, such as the State Public
Officials Law (Landesbeamtengesetz (LBG)) of North Rhine-Westphalia, which regulate state and local public officials within the state.
Other statutes, orders, decrees, and regulations address such matters
as benefits, assistance, and vacations.

262

Sections 79-92 of the BBG set forth in detail the rights of German
federal public officials. Those sections address eight topics: welfare
and protection (Ffirsorge- und Schutzpflicht) (§§ 79-80b); official title
(§ 81); salary and pension payments (§§ 82-87a); travel and moving
expenses (§ 88); vacations and election of a public official to a
legislative or municipal body (§§ 89-89a); personnel files (§ 90);
associations (§ 91); and proof of public service (§ 92).263
261See generally SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 104-125.
262 See BUNDESBEAMTENGcESETZE (Beck 1986) (collecting federal public officials laws,
regulations, and orders); H. REHioRN (ed.), GESETZE DES LANDES NORDRHEIN-WEST-

(1987) (collecting laws, regulations, and orders for the state of North RhineWestphalia). See generally WAGNER, supra note 57, at 17-20; ZEMER, supra note
63, at 9-10; EBERT, supra note 126, at 14-15.
263See also BRRG §§ 48-58; LBG(NRW) §§ 85-104. "The legal status of a public
official may not be altered under conditions, or in any form, not prescribed or
permitted by this law." BRRG § 59.
FALEN
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BBG § 79 requires that the federal government, "in the context
of the relationship of service and loyalty," provide for the well-being
of the public official and his or her family, including the period
following the conclusion of the public official relationship. This right
of the public official is one of the traditional principles of professional
officialdom guaranteed by Article 33(5) of the Constitution. 264 "That
principle [that the government must provide for the welfare of the
public official] is the correlative of the traditional principle of the
duty of loyalty of the public official [to the state].''265
Although a number of individual statutory provisions regulate specific rights of officials, such as vacations and compensation, the
obligation of the state to provide for the welfare of its public officials
is not limited to such provisions. Section 79 establishes that obligation
as a general principle. This section has been held to mandate, for
example, the provision of a safe work place, the protection of the
official's property, the protection of the official against political
pressure, and even efforts by the government to obtain the correction
of an untrue newspaper story directed against the official. 26 Section
79 would also include, for example, the duty of the federal government
to conduct itself in an open and trusting manner toward the official,
the duty to provide for the continued training and education of the
official, including periodic reviews of performance, and the duty to
advise the official. 267 BRRG § 48 and LBG(NRW) § 85 mandate
26
those same rights for state and local public officials.

264

43 BVERFGE 154 (1976); 58 BVERFGE 68 (1981). See generally SCHNELLENBACH,

supra note 124, at 118.
265 43 BVERFGE 154, 165 (1976) (citations omitted). See generally VON MONCH,
supra note 124, at 46.
266 See WAGNER, supra note 57, at 95-97.
267 See generally SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 370-81, 397-403; SCHNELLENBACH,
supra note 124, at 118-142; APEL, supra note 57, at 54; VON MONCH, supra note
124, at 46-49; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 95-97.
266 See also LBG(NRW) § 104(1) (specifically requiring periodic review of an
official's performance). BBG § 79a permits public officials who are actually caring
for a child under 18 years, or for another dependent in actual need of care, to
reduce their work time by up to one half or to obtain a leave of absence of up to
three years, with the possibility of extensions. Such leaves of absence may not exceed
a total of nine years; the periods of reduced work time and leaves of absence may
together not exceed 15 years. See also BRRG § 48a; LBG(NRW) § 85a. See generally
APEL, supra note 57, at 54-55. BBG § 80 states that special provisions for mothers
will be provided by regulation. See also LBG(NRW) § 86. See generally APEL, supra
note 57, at 55; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 380-81. BBG § 80a contains special
provisions for young public officials. See also BRRG § 55a. See generally APEL,
supra note 57, at 55; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 380-81.
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"The duty [of the state to provide the public official with] welfare
and protection means, above all, that the [public] employer, in its
decisions and other actions-and therefore also in the exercise of its
rights-must take into account the well-being and the legitimate interests of the public official; that duty prohibits, in particular, consideration of immaterial influences.

' 269

A violation of that duty may

270
in some instances entitle the official to assert a claim for damages.
State public officials laws may contain specific guarantees of assistance
27
in the event of illness, birth, and death. '

For present purposes, the other rights of public officials specifically
laid down in the BBG, BRRG, and various state laws need only be
listed. Such rights include, for example:
272
- The right to use an official title;
273
- Regulation of compensation by the Compensation Law;
- Allowances for, and restrictions on, the assignment, attachment,
or garnishment of the official's salary, or use of the official's salary
27 4
as security;
- Regulation of pension payments by the Public Officials Pension
Law ;275
- Prohibition against changing a public official's salary, pension
payments, or compensation level under the compensation laws, except
by law;

27 6

- Prohibition against the state recovering salary overpayments when
277
a public official's compensation is reduced retroactively;
supra note 1, at 371 (footnotes omitted).
13 BVERFGE 17 (1961). See also SCHIEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 372. See
generally BBG §§ 171-175; BRRG §§ 60, 126-127; LBG(NRW) §§ 179-181 (regulating
proceedings by federal, state, and local public officials, retired public officials, and
their dependents against the public employer for claims arising out of the public
official relationship); SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 142-44 (discussing same).
271 See, e.g., LBG(NRW) § 88.
272 BBG § 81; LBG(NRW) §§ 92-93. See generally ZEILER, supra note 63, at 105106; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 98; APEL, supra note 57, at 56; SCHEERBARTH,
supra note 1, at 382-85.
273 BBG § 83; LBG(NRW) §§ 94-95. See also BBG § 80b and LBG(NRW) § 90
(anniversary gifts). See generally WAGNER,supra note 57, at 104-105; VON MONCH,
supra note 124, at 49-52; SCHNELLENBACH, supra note 124, at 121-23.
274 BBG § 84; BRRG § 51. See also Civil Procedure Law (Zivilprozessordnung
(ZPO)) §§ 850-850k.
275 BBG § 85; LBG(NRW) § 96. See also BRRG § 50. See generally WAGNER,
supra note 57, at 105.
276 BBG § 86; BRRG § 50.
277 BBG § 87; BRRG § 53; LBG(NRW) § 98. See generally VON MONCH, supra
note 124, at 52-54.
269SCHBERBARTH,
270
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- Prohibition against an official, a retired official, or one of their
dependents being disadvantaged when that individual's claim against
a third person for personal injury or death is subordinated to the
state for recovery of compensation or benefits paid by the state on
account of the injury or death; 278
279
- Regulation of travel and moving expenses by law;

- Right to an annual paid vacation, a two-month unpaid leave of
absence to campaign for the Bundestag or a state office, a leave of
20
absence for participation in local government;
Right to a reduction of work hours or to an unpaid leave of
absence upon election to a state legislative body if the elective office
2
is compatible with the public official's employment; '
- Right to view the entire contents of one's personnel file, to be
heard before a matter adverse to the official is entered in the personnel
28 2
file, and to include a statement in the file;
- Right to unionize or form associations; right to authorize the
union or association to represent the official to the extent permitted
by law; guarantee against repercussions for participation in a union
-

or association;

283

- Right upon request, after conclusion of the public official relationship, to a certificate stating the nature and length of the offices
held by the official. 28

278 BBG § 87a; BRRG § 52; LBG(NRW) § 99. See generally VON MONCH, supra
note 124, at 54.
279 BBG § 88; LBG(NRW) § 100. See generally WAGNER, supra note 57, at 105106; SCHNELLIENBACH, supra note 124, at 123, 137.
28 BBG § 89; LBG(NRW) § 101. See also BRRG § 55 (annual paid vacation).
See generally ZELER, supra note 63, at 106; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 99-100;

SCHEERBARTH, supra
281 BBG § 89a.

note 1, at 387-92.

282 BBG § 90; BRRG § 56; LBG(NRW) § 102. See also LBG(NRW) § 104(1) (right
of public official to discuss and respond to reviews of his or her performance before
the review is entered in the official's personnel file). See generally ZEILER, supra
note 63, at 106-107; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 100-101; VON MONCH, supra note
124, at 54-57; APEL, supra note 57, at 56-57; SCHNELLFNBACH, supra note 124, at

125 n.53a;

SCHEERBARTH,

supra note 1, at 392-97.

BBG § 91; BRRG § 57; LBG(NRW) § 103. See also BBG § 94; BRRG § 58;
LBG(NRW) § 106 (requiring that the government inform unions of the preparation
of general rules relating to public officials). See generally WAGNER, supra note 57,
at 101; APEL, supra note 57, at 57; SCHEERBARTH, supra note 1, at 386-87.
28
BBG § 92; LBG(NRW) § 104(2). See generally ZEILER, supra note 63, at 107108; WAGNER, supra note 57, at 102; APEL, supra note 57, at 57; SCHEERBARTH,
supra note 1, at 403-04.
283
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Guaranteeing the rights of public officials in these ways serves
three functions critical to the establishment and maintenance of ethical
standards among those public officials: (1) preserving their independence; (2) raising the stakes for ethical improprieties to an unacceptable level; and (3) encouraging ethical conduct rather than
285
merely discouraging unethical conduct.
First, Germany has concluded that only by protecting such rights
can the state ensure the independence of its public officials. "The
personal independence of public officials (appointment for life) and
their independence in office (professional responsibility solely to the
law) [enable them to fulfill] the function and purpose of professional
officialdom: to realize the demands of a state governed by law and
social welfare, to nurture equality, security, continuity, and social
justice, to secure the political and social neutrality of public administration, and to guarantee balance and stability in the face of political
forces. "1286
To exempt from such protection, as is done in the United States,
precisely that class of public servants-namely, public officials-who
exercise the greater authority is completely counterproductive. Indeed,
the recognition by American legislative bodies that they must subject
public officials to special ethical requirements in effect concedes that
the law does not sufficiently protect the independence of public
officials from political, financial, and other pressures. Yet consistent
with their tradition of treating the symptoms while ignoring the
disease, American legislatures have imposed one ethical requirement
after another upon public officials without securing the officials'
ability, as a practical matter, to comply with those requirements.
Indeed, if public officials were provided with sufficient protection
from outside pressures, and with sufficient incentive to withstand
such pressures as do exist, then perhaps the need for layer upon
layer of ethics legislation would be obviated.
Thus, for example, this author has repeatedly been told by municipal officials that prohibitions upon political contributions and
activities by public officials provide insufficient protection against

285 Cf. WEnsE, supra note 124, at 164-65: "If the duties of public officials ...
have as their purpose assuring that the state will fulfill its responsibilities [to the
public], so is the purpose of the rights of public officials a double one: (a) Those
rights are also to guarantee the fulfillment of duties [to the public]... ; (b) Of equal
importance, [the rights] are appropriately to secure the significant interests of the
public official as a dependent employee." (Emphasis added).
11 DBB ABC, supra note 196, at 9-10.
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pressures to engage in those activities because the jobs of many such
officials depend upon the will of politicians. Perhaps the answer to
undue political influence upon public officials lies not in restricting
their political activities but in protecting their jobs. Such a proposal
is hardly revolutionary. As Alexander Hamilton stated with respect
to proposed life tenure for federal judges, "[p]eriodical appointments,
however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or
other, be fatal to their necessary independence." ' 287 It is suggested

that independence from political and financial pressures is no less
necessary for public officials if they are properly to perform their
jobs, and that employment at will is no less fatal to that independence.
Indeed, the civil service system itself strives to some extent to fulfill
that goal for middle and lower level public employees. Life tenure
(that is, guaranteed employment until retirement) for American public
officials should be seriously considered.
Second, in trips around New York State on behalf of that state's
Commission on Government Integrity, this writer was repeatedly told
that the stakes for unethical conduct must be raised. Yet increased
criminal penalties, a solution suggested by many legislators and executives, are not the answer. In an area fraught with ambiguities,
the imposition of heavy fines or prison sentences is unjust, even if
permissible constitutionally and otherwise. Such a course casts a pall
over public service, thereby discouraging honest individuals from
becoming public servants. It sends a message to honest public officials
that their actions are suspect, their every move subject to strict
scrutiny, and their every misstep punishable by criminal sanctions.
Harsh penalties, combined with the traditionally low salaries and
often low prestige of public service, severely undermine the morale
of public officials and devastate recruitment efforts. "Who needs
this grief" is a common, and justified, complaint-a complete rejection of the admonition that "[w]hoever would command, must in
commanding find happiness.

'28

Instead, the stakes must be raised not by threatening public officials
with jail but by threatening them with the loss of secure, well-paying
positions, with loss of a career, with loss of any hope of obtaining
any position as a public official anywhere in the United States. As
287 The

Federalist, No. 78.

288J. von Goethe, Faust, part II, act 4, lines 10252-53 ("Wer befehlen soll,/Muss
im Befehlen Seligkeit empfinden"). It might be noted, however, that those words
are spoken by Faust.
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one municipal attorney informed this writer, the need is for more
carrots and fewer sticks. Such an approach is not without precedent
in this country. Even now, for example, any member of the International City Management Association (ICMA) who is expelled from
that organization for violating its strict code of ethics is, as a practical
matter, barred from obtaining a municipal management position (e.g.,
a city manager) anywhere in the country, for a municipality is unlikely
to hire any manager who has been banished from ICMA, and many
28 9
jurisdictions make ICMA membership a condition of employment.
Although the ICMA model could not automatically be extended to
all public officials-the number of municipal managers forms but a
minute percentage of the total number of public officials, who would
have to be regulated by law not by a private organization-that model
at least points the way to the establishment of a professional public
officialdom in the United States, an officialdom comprised of licensed,
well-paid, tenured, career public officials.
Third, ethics laws in the United States, by focusing almost entirely
on the duties of public officials without recognizing their concomitant
rights, have failed to acknowledge that such laws can only succeed,
at most, in prohibiting unethical conduct. They do not, nor can they,
promote, much less ensure, ethical conduct. If true peace, as Dr.
King once said, is not merely the absence of war but the presence
of justice, then, too, ethics in government is not merely the absence
of corruption but the presence of trust; and trust cannot be mandated,
it must be nurtured. Enacting ethics law after ethics law not only
fails to deter corruption; it destroys trust and thus, ultimately, un29
dermines ethics in government. 0
In short, the time has come for a moratorium on the enactment
of any additional ethics legislation. Instead, what must first be considered and enacted is a bill of rights for American public officials.
The American people, through their elected representatives, must
reestablish a bond of mutual trust, loyalty, and dedication between

from ICMA also includes "notification to the ... state association,
appropriate local governing bodies, and news media, that the respondent has been
found to have violated the Code of Ethics, that ICMA strongly disapproves of the
respondent's conduct, and that the respondent has been expelled from the organization." Rules of Procedure for enforcing the ICMA Code of Ethics, reprinted in
69 Public Management, Aug. 1987, at 14.
290 See Little, Abolishing FinancialDisclosure to Improve Government, 16 STETSON
L. REv. 633, 634 (1987) (concluding that "the Florida system of financial disclosure
289 Expulsion

has deeply eroded the idea of 'trust'

between the public and its officials).
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their public officials and themselves. Without that bond, ethics laws
are not only futile, they are injurious to the ethical health of American
government.
Of course, there is a quid pro quo for higher salaries and more
secure jobs. In return for life tenure and the accompanying benefits,
German public officials are subject to strict educational, training,
and examination requirements, 291 as well as exacting ethical standards. 292 No less should be demanded of American public officials.
CONCLUSION

Officials' duties presuppose officials' rights. The German model
for public officials laws conclusively demonstrates that immutable
fact. One can neither expect nor demand that American public officials avoid even the appearance of impropriety unless one gives
them the tools with which to do so, and the most important tools
are independence in office and a mutual relationship of trust and
obligation between public officials and their public employer.
That independence and that mutual relationship are grounded upon
the establishment and protection of the rights of the public officials.
For German public officials, those rights include welfare and protection; adequate compensation; the creation of an area of activity
where only public officials may exercise authority; appointment and
advancement solely upon the basis of merit and without regard to
race, sex, religion, or political affiliation; and, most importantly,
tenure in office.
The American people, and their elected representatives, must step
back and decide just how important a trusted and trustworthy government is, whether it is sufficiently important to grant to American
public officials rights analogous to those enjoyed by their German
counterparts. In particular, American legislators must consider the
establishment of a professional public officialdom, comprised of licensed, well-paid, tenured, career public officials. That issue raises
a host of complex questions and problems-of lessening the people's
29, See generally BBG §§ 6-14, BRRG §§ 5-10, LBG(NRW) §§ 8-14a (appointment);
BBG §§ 15-25, BRRG §§ 11-16, LBG(NRW) §§ 15-26 (career paths (education and
training)); and BBG §§ 28-34, BRRG §§ 22-24, LBG(NRW) §§ 30-37 (termination

of employment); and accompanying executive orders and regulations, collected in
BUNDESBEAMTENGESETZE (Beck 1986) (federal) and H. REmBoRN (ed.), GESETZE DES
LANDES NORDR-EIN-WESTFALEN (Beck 1987) (North Rhine-Westphalia).
292 See

BBG §§ 52-78; BRRG §§ 35-47; LBG(NRW) §§ 55-84.
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and the politicians' control over a large segment of government; of
decreasing citizen participation in government; of concentrating, rather
than dispersing, power throughout government; of restricting "new
blood" from entering the body politic; of increasing, or decreasing,
government's efficiency, cost, and bureaucracy; of undermining the
political party system by destroying patronage; of redefining affirmative action and civil service.
Those questions and problems can no longer be ignored. Repeated
instances of ethical violations by government officials have created
the perception, unjustified in fact, that American public officials are
generally untrustworthy and corrupt. Confidence in the integrity of
government has fallen to a new low.
Yet that crisis in confidence cannot be combatted by the imposition
of more and more ethics laws. That fact has been recognized, at
least implicitly, by President Reagan in pocket-vetoing the PostEmployment Restrictions Act of 1988 and by the politicians, public
officials, and handful of scholars who have opposed more ethics
legislation. Indeed, additional ethics laws not only "discourage from
Government service America's best talent because of the unfair burdens [they] . . . impose," 293 those laws also further undermine the
efforts and ability of public officials to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety. The end result is further erosion of citizens' confidence
in government.
Thus, the imposition of additional ethical obligations must ceaseuntil American legislators secure those rights of public officials necessary to enable their compliance with existing ethics legislation,
necessary to establish and maintain a vital and independent public
service. And secure those rights they must. Inaction will only accelerate the dizzying downward spiral of ethical crises in American
government.
Finally, wholly apart from the dictates of political necessity, a
nation that claims concern for the rights and welfare of its people
should, at the very least, demonstrate that concern for its public
servants. Of them has much been demanded. To them should at least
a little be given in return.

293

Reagan Memorandum of Disapproval, at 1561.

